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EDWIN M. BORCHAIR
The common law and the political theory underlying both British and
American constitutional law have been regarded as a bulwark of pro-
tection to the individual in his relations with the Government. The
"rule of law" which Dicey and others extol is designed by judicial
control to restrict within the bounds of legality the operation of the
governmental machine in its contact with the citizen. Yet it requires
but a slight appreciation of the facts to realize that in Anglo-American
law the individual citizen is left to bear almost all the risks of a defec-
tive, negligent, perverse or erroneous administration of the State's
functions, an unjust burden which is becoming graver and more fre-
quent as the Government's activities become more diversified and as we
leave to administrative officers in even greater degree the determination
of the legal relations of the individual citizen. Obviously the Admin-
istration cannot be held to the obligation of guaranteeing the citizen
against all errors or defects, for life in an organized community requires
a certain number of sacrifices and even risks. The unexampled
expansion of the police power in the United States daily illustrates the
uncompensated sacrifices to which the individual is exposed by the
rightful operation of the State's public powers. Yet there is no
reason why the most flagrant of the injuries wrongfully sustained by
the citizen, those arising from the torts of officers, should be allowed
to rest, as they now generally do, in practice if not in theory, at the
door of the unfortunate citizen alone. This hardship becomes the
more incongruous when it is realized that it is greatest in countries
like Great Britain and the United States, where democracy is assumed
to have placed the individual on the highest plane of political freedom
and individual justice. When Justice Miller of the United States
Supreme Court remarked in Gibbons v. United States' that "no govern-
(1868, U. S.) 8 Wall. 269.
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ment has ever held itself liable to individuals for the misfeasance,
laches or unauthorized exercise of power by its officers or agents," his
horizon was extremely limited, for he overlooked the fact that practi-
cally every country of western Europe has long admitted such liability.
There seems no sound reason why the English-speaking countries,
where the public service is -usually in less professional hands than on the
continent, should not adopt modern social and legal principles in deter-
niining the legal relations between the Government in its administration
of the public services, the officers and agents whom it employs for this
service, and the individual members of the community. It was Lord.
Macaulay who remarked that "the primary end of Government is the
protection of the persons and_ property of men."
The reatsdn for this long-continued and grooving injustice in Anglo-
American law rests, of course, upon a medieval Enklish theory that "the
King can do no wrong," which without sufficient understanding was
introduced with the common law into this country, and has survived
mainly by reason of its antiquity.2 The facts that the conditions which
gave it birth and that the theory of absolutism which kept it alive in
England never prevailed in this country and have since been discarded
by the most monarchical countries of Europe, have nevertheless been
unavailing to secure legislative reconsideration of the propriety and jus-
tification of the rule that the State is not legally liable for the torts of its
officers. To be sure, we profess to ease the conscience by according
the injured individual an action against the wrong-doing officer-fre-
quently a person without pecuniary responsibility-or else, under our
decentralized system of administbiation, by permitting an action against
political subdivisions of the State'and local bodies and corporations for
injuries inflicted when acting in their "private" or "corporate" as dis-
tinguished froni their "governmental" capacities. But no serious effort
has been made to penetrate the mysticism encumbering this depart-
ment of the law and to relieve it of its theological and metaphysical
conceptions and misconceptions.
Realization, spasmodically by the courts, and occasionally in particu-
lar cases by legislatures, of the unwarranted hardship often worked by
the rule that the State is not liable for the torts of its officers, and the
desire to square the demands of justice with the maintenance of a legal
anachronism canonized as a legal maxim, have brought about the result,
by the introduction of fictions, artificial distinctions and concessions to
'That this maxim was misunderstood even by Blackstone and Coke, see the
excellent monograph of Ludwik Ehrlich, Proceedings against the Crown (192i)
42-49, The maxim mnerely meant that the King was not privileged to do wrong.
-if his acts were against the -law, they were injuriae (wrongs). Bracton, while
ambiguous in his several statements as to the relation between the King and the
law, did not intend to convey the idea that he was incapable of committing a legal
wrong. Ehrlich, op. cit., 43. . Indeed, there-appears to have been a considerable
measure of redress obtainable, though_ not damages. Ibid. 44-46.
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expediency, that the law governing the redress of the fndividual against
the public authorities, national, State, or municipal, for injuries sus-
tained in the exercise of governmental powers, is in a state of incon-
gruity and confusion unique in history. The hazards run by the
administrative officer who may have acted in perfect good faith, and
by the private individual, illustrated in such cases as Miller v. Horton
s
and Little v. Barreme,4 manifest defective social engineering-to use
Roscoe Pound's term-hardly creditable to an enlightened community.
The injustice of the prevailing rule is recognized in England, and a
movement for the reform of the law in this respect is now in progress.'
The difficulty, of course, lies in the fact that we consider ourselves
bound by the fetters of a medieval doctrine, often regarded as having
the institutional impregnability of an article of faith, which never had
much, if any, justification, and that legislatures have been unwilling to
reexamine the whole subject from the point of view of theory and his-
tory, in order to bring the law into harmony with the practical exigencies
of modern life. Such an attempt these articles propose to make. In the
course of the work, effort will be directed to pointing out the anomalies
and paradoxes in the present state of the law, the present lack of
theoretical justification for the prevailing doctrine of irresponsibility,
the theories on which the responsibility of the State has been justified,
the history of the doctrine of responsibility, and the state of the law
in continental Europe. With this exposition, it is hoped that it will have
been demonstrated that justice and a respect for the rights of the indi-
vidual demand that Government, national, state and municipal, shall
now adopt the necessary legislation to admit the legal responsibility of
the State or city for the torts of its officers. At best, that liability
will not be unlimited, and an attempt will be made to indicate, the
appropriate bounds of the proposed doctrine. If the reader should
become convinced that the most flagrant and tortious of the invasions
of the rights of the individual by act of public authority justify, not
an individual sacrifice, but a distribution of the burden among the com-
munity at large, it may become possible to suggest an acceptable social
and legal theory upon which many sacrifices and burdens now right-
"Miller v. Horton (1891) 152 Mass. 54o, 26 N. E. ioo. Here health officers,
experts, concluding after investigation that a horse was afflicted with glanders,
ordered its destruction, and were later held liable in damages for what a jury
found to be a mistaken conclusion of fact.
'Little v. Bfarreme (1804, UI. S.) 2 Cranch, 17o; Elmore v. Fields (19o7) 153
Ala. 345, 45 So, 66.
'See W. S. Holdsworth in (1922) 38 L. QUART. REV. 295. See Ministry of
Transport Act (1919) 9 & io Geo. V, c. 5o, sec. 26 which provides that "the
Minister . . . . shall be responsible for the acts and defaults of the officers and
servants and agents of the Ministry in like manner and to the like extent as if
they were his servants." See also Ministry of Munitions and Shipping (Ces-
sation) Act Igzf discussed in Marshal Shipping Co., Ltd. v. Board of Trade
(1923, C. A.) 39 T. L. R 415.
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fully imposed under the police power would more equitably be dis-
tributed under the power of eminent domain.
ANOMALIES IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW
Taking it for granted that in Anglo-American law the Crown or
State cannot be sued without its consent, it will nevertheless be of some
interest to observe how this maxim came into existence, its theoretical
basis and its present application. The examination of its origins in
English legal history and the criticism of the theories on which it has
been justified, will be left for later discussion. At this point, it is pro-
posed merely to examine some of the vicissitudes of the doctrine, the
doubtful expedients and distinctions adopted by the courts in squaring
its application with an effort to do occasional justice and the barren
inconsistencies and anomalies into which the law has thus been led.
Blackstone has attributed the maxim that "the King can do no
wr6ng" to the royal prerogative, which he defines as "that special pre-
eminence which the King hath over and above all other persons, and
out of the course of the common law, in right of his royal dignity .....
The law ascribes to the King the attribute of sovereignty"; he is
"sovereign and independent" within his own dominions and "owes no
kind of subjection to any other potentate on earth. Hence it is that
no suit or action can be brought against the King, even in civil matters,
because no court can have jurisdiction over him, for all jurisdiction
implies superiority of power."6  Chitty adds that "the inviolability of
the King is essential to the existence of his powers as supreme magis-
trate; and therefore his person is sacred. The law supposes it impos-
sible that the King himself can act unlawfully or improperly. It can-
not distrust him whom it has invested with the supreme power; and
visits on his advisors and ministers the punishment due to the illegal
measures of government. Hence the legal apothegm that the King can
do no wrong."7
Nothing seems more clear than that this immunity of the King from
the jurisdiction of the King's courts was purely personal. How it came
to be applied in the United States of America, where the prerogative is
unknown, is one of the mysteries of legal evolution. Admitting its
application to the sovereign and its illogical ascription as an attribute
of sovereignty generally, it is not easy to appreciate its application to
the United States, where the location of sovereignty-undivided
sovereignty, as orthodox theory demands-is a difficult undertaking.
It is beyond doubt that the Executive in the United States is not his-
torically the sovereign s and the legislature, which is perhaps the deposi-
o I Commentaries 239, 241-2.
'Chitty, The Law of the Prerogative of the Crown (1820) 5.
82 Goodnow, Comparative Administrative Law (1893) 156. United States v.
Lee (1882) io6 U. S. 196, 2o5, I Sup. Ct 240.
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tory of the widest powers, is restrained by constitutional. limitations.
The federal government is one of delegated powers and the states are
not sovereign, according to the Constitution, as demonstrated forcibly
by the Civil War and the resulting Amendments. That brings us to
the only remaining alternative, that sovereignty resides in the American
electorate or the people.9 Thus, we are led to the conclusion that the
prerogative of the King's immunity from the jurisdiction and alleged
resulting infallibility, the apotheosis of absolutism, have by evolution
devolved upon the democratic American people, presumably both as
citizens of the States and of 'the United States. The awkwardness of
this conclusion is heighten'ed by the fact that whereas in England, to
prevent the jurisdictional immunity resulting in too gross an injustice,
the petition of right, whose origin has been traced back to the thir-
teenth century,10 was devised as. a substitute for a formal action
against the Crown, in America no substitute except an appeal to the
generosity of the legislature has in most jurisdictions been afforded. In
only a few states is judicial relief available. The difficulty of recon-
ciling the royal prerogative with democratic government has, in fact,
led some of our courts to deny the applicability of the English doctrine
of kingly immunity and put it merely on the general ground of public
policy, or what Justice Millet called "the general doctrine of publicists,"
that "the supreme power in every state, wherever it may reside, shall
not be compelled, by process of courts of its own creation, to defend
itself from assaults in those courts."'1  It will be recalled, however,
*In Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886) 118 U. S. 356, 6 Sup. Ct. lo64, Mathews, J.,
said: "In our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of
government,"--a somewhat doubtful proposition--"sovereignty itself remains with
the people by whom and for whom all government exists and acts." So Miller,
J., in Uniited Slates v. Lee (1883) io6 U. S. 196, 2o8, i Sup. Ct. 251: "Under our
system the people .... are the sovereign." See also LeRoy G. Pilling, An Inter-
pretatio n of the Eleventh Amendment (1917) 15 MicH. L. Rav. 468. We shall
later criticize the theory of popular sovereignty.
"0 Its origin is uncertain. See the evidence for and against its origin in an
enactment of Edward I in Clode, The Law and Practice of Petition of Right
(1887) 2-4. Ehrlich, op. cit., 83 et seq. Holdsworth, The History of Remedies
against the Crown (1922) 38 L. QUART. REV. 141, 147, 28d et seq. Robertson,
Civil Proceedings against the Crown (9o8) 330 et seq. In Monckton v. Atty.
Gen. (85o, Ch.) 2 Mac. & G. 402, 412, Lord Cottei'ham said: "The proceeding
by. petition of right exists only for the purpose of reconciling the dignity of the
Crown and the rights of the subject, and to protect the latter against any injury
arising from the acts of the former; but it is no part of its object to enlarge or
alter those rights." The construction denying relief f~r torts has greatly nar-
rowed the injuries for which the subject can sue by petition, and yet the petition is
broader in its remedies than are the bulk of the American statutes and decisions.
' United States v. Lee (1883) io6 U. S. 196, 1 Sup. Ct. z4g. See also Langfbrd
v. United States (1879) i1o U. S. 34I, 343, in which Miller, 3., remarked that "we
do not understand that either in reference to the government of the United States,
or of the several states, or of any of their officers, the English maxim has any
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that it took a constitutional' amendment, the eleventh, to establish this
as an American federal policy with respect to the states of the union,
for in the case of Chisholm v. State of Georgia2 only one dissenting
judge, Iredell, sustained the principle of immunity as fundamental.' 3
No doubts have been expressed as to the jurisdiction of the federal
Supreme Court over suits by one State against another or by the United
States against a State. Yet it remains true that an individual cannot
sue a Statewithout its consent, either in its own or in the federal courts.
14
Since many states have not yet granted such consent and since those that
have, have so qualified it as to exclude practically all cases of liability
for tort, it is proper to show that the reasons which once may have been
deemed to justify .the public polity of immunity from suit and responsi-
bility do not in fact to-day prevail, and that public policy now requires
that the State shall voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of judicial
tribunals to answer for torts committed by its officers against the person
or property "of its citizens. Whether a valid distinction can analytically
be drawn between substantive liability-as on contract, as some courts
insiste'-and procedural immunity from suit, is a question which will
be more fully considered in the discussion of theory in the second part
of this study.
The English system of subjecting the Crown to suit by petition of
existence in this country." But Professor Burgess adopts the full theory that
"the'State can do no wrong." i Political Science and Constitutional Law (I8gi)
57. In Langford v. United States, supra, it is said "The English maxim does. not
declare that the Government, or those who administer it, can do no wrong."
"(1793 U. S.) 2 Dallas 419, 429. Chief Justice Jay (at p. 47i) saw no incom-
patibility between suability and sovereignty. Cf. Mr. Justice Holmes, infra.
Jay saw no sound distinction between a citizen suing the forty thousand citizens
of Philadelphia, which every one admitted, and the fifty thousand citizens of
Delaware. It is true, however, that Hamilton, Marshall and Madison had not
contemplated that a state could be sued by a citizen in the federal courts.
IThe protest of several of the states against Chisholn v. Georgia, which led
to the Eleventh Amendment, was induced not by any apprehension that the
dignity' of the State would be degraded by compulsory appearance before the
federal court, but by the very practical fear that they might by such compulsory
jurisdiction be compelled to pay their debts. See Marshall, C.J., in Cohens v.
Virginia (1821 U. S.) 6 Wheat. 264, 4o6; Guthrie, The Eleventh Amendment
(1go8) 8 CoL. L. Rav. 183, 186; Fleischmann, The Dishonesty of Sovereignties
(i91o) N. Y. ST. B. A. REP. 234; Braxton (19o7) VA. ST. B. A. REP. 172.
See also Taft, C.J., dissenting opinion in Sloan Shipyard Corp. v. U. S. Shipping
Board (1922) 258 U. S. 549, 573, to the effect that the prolonged delay of Congress
in providing for the settlement of the French Spoliation claims "put in the hearts
of claimants a deep sense of the injustice of Governments."
I"Hans v. -Louisiana (i889) I34 U. S. i, 10 Sup. Ct. 504; Beers v. Arkansas
(x857 U. S.) 2o Howard 527, 529; Smith. v. Reeves (igoo) 178 U. S. 436, 2o
Sup. Ct. 919. Barrett v. State (ig2o) =2o N. Y. 423, 116 N. E. gg.
" Chapman v. State (1894) lo4 Calif. 69o, 38 Pac. 457; Carr v. State (i8gi)
T27 Ind. 204, 26 N. E. 778; Danolds v. State (1882) 89 N. Y. 36.
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right has been deemed a proceeding not of grace but of right,
1 though
in theory the fiat may be withheld at any time and is withheld in claims
arising out of tort. Practice has, however, developed the rule of law
that the petition of right lies to obtain from the Crown restitution of
lands or goods, or if this is impossible, then money damages for wrong-
ful detention, or damages. for breach of contract, including goods sup-
plied to the Crown or to the public service:1
7  Curiously, it was not
until 1874 that it was definitely established that damages could be
recovered for breach of contract,"" though it must be left to conjecture
why breach of contract was less a "wrong" than an ordinary tort, or
why the recovery not barred by the tort element involved in disseisin
or wrongful detention of chattels, realror personal, should not logi-
cally 'be extended to include conversiol and other torts against the"
'
subject1 9 In the United States, contract claims have been recoverable
in the Court of Claims since 1855. In England, damages for torts were
recoverable against the wrongdoing officer, who generally at least could
not plead in defense either reasons of state or command of the CrownA-
or King.2 0 Even this limited protection to the citizen has now been
much qualified by the growth of administrative justice with its dis-
cretionary acts which escape judicial review.
21 But an even greater
injustice is done by reason of the maxim that the doctrine of respondeat
' As in the case of the extraordinary legal remedies, the discretion in granting
the writ has by practice been hardened-into rule. See cases in Holdsworth,
op. cit., 38 L. QUART. REv. 289 et seq. and Clode, op. cit. p. 64 et seq. United
.States v. O'Keefe (87o) ii Wall. I78, 183; United States v. Lee (1883) 
1o6
U. S. i96, 2o5. See Baron de Bode v. The Queen (1848) 13 Q. B. 364, 387. A
practice has recently been begun of instituting an action for a declaration against
Crown officers, instead of 'proceeding by petition of right. Dyson v. Attorney-
General [1911] i K. B. 4111 China Mutual Steam Navigation Co. v. Maclay,
Shipping Controller [x1gi] i K. B. 33. The courts will doubtless place limita-
tions upon this method of suing the Crown.
T See Cockburn, C.J., in Feather v. The Queen (1865 Q. B.) 6 B. & G. 257, 293.
Instances of such claims will be found in io Hals. Laws Eng. 27. See also
Chitty, Prerogatives of the Crown, supra, p. 340 et seq., Clode7, op. cit., 64 et seq.
The tcrt element in disseisin or the wrongful detention of chattels real or per-
sonal, seems to be outweighed by the fact that in such cases of wrongful depriva-
tion of property by the King the petition of right historically lay. In such cases,
the Court of Claims or the Supreme C6urt would not allow recovery. Langford
v. United States (1879) Ioi U. S. 341.
Thomas v. The Queen (1874) L. P, io Q. B. 31, 36.
Such an extension is strongly recommended by Dr. Holdsworth in 38 L.
QuART. REv. 295.
" Entick v. Carrington (1765) ig State Trials Io3o, 1o73. It is. doubtful
whether to~day a discretionary act, without malice, of a superior officer entails
any liability. Feather v. The Queen (i865 Q. B.) 6 B.-& G. 257, 297; Raleigh
v. Gosche); (1898) j Ch. 73. In the United States, see Little v. Barreme (1804,
U. S.) 2 Cranch, i7o; Otis v. Bacon (1813 U. S.) 7 Cranch, 589.
-Tozer v. Child '(1857, Q. B.) -7 &_ & B. 377; People ex rel. Sheppard v.
Illinois State Board of Dental Examiners (18g4) IXO Ill. iSo.
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superior has no application to the King or Crown-or, with us, the
State-which in theory can neither do nor authorize a wrong, and
that even a superior officer is not liable for the torts of his subordinates,'
unless he expressly commands the tort-not a common case.2 2  Thus
the individual's recourse is usually confined to a subordinate wrongdoer,
upon whom the risks of accepting public office fall with unjust severity
and with detriment to the public service. Small pay with large risks
induces fear to enforce the law. A health officer, for example, who
in good faith believes a horse to have glanders or anthrax and there-
upon orders it shot may, on the verdict of a lay jury that he was mis-
taken, find himself subjected to heavy damages, 23 without support or
sympathy from the Government, with the result that his successors or
colleagues will probably decline thereafter to assume such risks and
will permit the community at large to bear the risk and the danger. Nor,
as already observed, is it any defense to the subordinate that he acted
under orders of a superior, even the highest executive officer, if the
order proves for any reason to have been illegal. This defective social
engineering can only be rightly improved by placing the risk of honest
official mistakes upon the community, where it properly belongs.2 4
=Lane v. Cotton (1701, K. B.) i Ld. R., 646. Such a rare case has occurred
in the case of a Secretary of State, Entick v. Carrington, supra, and in the case
of colonial governors, who were not, however, deemed to possess sovereign
powers, but limited powers, any transgression of which made them liable in tort.
See Musgrave v. Pulido (P. C. 1879) 5 'A. C. 1o2 and the cases there discussed.
J f an act of state in the true sense, it of course escapes judicial control. Moore,
Acts of State (i9o6) passim. For American cases of immunity of superior
officers for tortious acts of subordinates see Keenan v. Southworth (1872) 11o
Mass. 474, and Robertson v. Sichel (1886) 127 U. S. 507, 515, 8 Sup. Ct. 1286,
and cases there cited. Story, Agency (8th ed.) sec. 319.
The curious view seems to prevail that it would be harmful to the State to
apply the doctrine of respondeat superior to the injuries committed by its officers
upon members of the public. So in Russel v. Devon County (1788) 2 T. R.
667 it was said "it is better for the individual to suffer than for the public to
be inconvenienced"; and in Robertson v. Sichel, supra, quoting Story: "[The
Government] does not guarantee to any person the fidelity of any of its officers
or agents whom it employs; since that would involve it, in all its operations,
in endless embarrassments and difficulties, which would be subversive of the
public interests." How crude a view of social policy is expressed in these
opinions will become apparent when the principles, theory and practice of the
countries of continental Europe in this respect are examined in subsequent
articles, infra.
'Miller v. Horton (1891) 152 Mass. 540, 26 N. E. ioo; Lowe v. Conroy
(1o4) 220 Wis. 1I, 97 N. W. 942. Other courts have gone to the other extreme
and permitted the individual to bear his loss, if the officer acted in good faith.
See Raymond v. Fish (1883) 51 Conn. 8o; Valentine v. City of Englewood
(19o8) 76 N. J. L. 5o9, 71 Atl. 344, and CommENTs (igog) I8 YALE LAw JourmAL,
417.
"4In a number of jurisdictions, like New York, the Board of Health, appearing
on behalf of the city, or the city itself, is made liable for destruction of
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Here we cannot leave out of account the fact that two states of this
country, at least, have evidenced a high sense'of social responsibility and
individual justice by making the state pecuniarily responsible, up to a
limited sum, to the victims of errors in the administration of criminal
justice. Persons erroneously convicted of crime in California and Wis-
consin may, upon proof of the mistake, obtain compensation from the
state up to $5,000, on the theory that the state, in the pursuit- of crime,
a public function, has erroneously taken the liberty of, and therefore
imposed an unjust burden upon, a private individual in the public inter-
est. For such mistakes, as is the case in most of the countries of




So strongly entrenched in the judicial'mind is the principle of immun-
ity in tort that legislative consent to suit, though granted in the broadest
language, has been deemed to exclude liability for tort. Thus, under a
Washington statute providing that "any person . ..having any claim
against the state of Washington shall have the right to begin an action
against the state in the superior court," it was held that "claim"? was
.ynonymous with "cause of action," and as there never had been any
cause of action arising out of the torts of officers, the statute was
construed merely to provide a remedy against the state by suit in existing
causes of action, but not to create any new grounds of liability, nor
waive any former defense 26  In New York the Court of Appeals has
property by health officers acting under mistaken belief that they were destroying
a nuisance, or who otherwise wrongfully destroyed private property. N. Y. Cons.
Laws, i9o7, see. 1oi; New York .City Charter, N. Y. Laws, igoi, ch. 466, sec.
ii96; Freund, Cases on Administrative Law (i91i) 358. The legislature fre-
quently makes special appropriations to compensate the owners of diseased cattle
destroyed in the public interest. See New York Times, Apr. 2o, i924. In Eng-
land, where a ship is detained on suspicion of being unsafe or unseaworthy, 'and
on later examination proves to be safe and seaworthy, the Government assumes
the obligation to pay compensation to the owner. Thompson v. Farrer (I882)
L. R 9 Q. B. Div. 372, 384. This is so obviously sensible, that it is surprising
how slow our states and cities are to appreciate its practical justice.
" Wis. Sts. 1921, sec. 32o3a; Sts. Calif., 1913, ch. i65. Such statutes are in force
in France, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Austria, Spain, Portugal and
several cantons of Switzerland. The system differs somewhat from country to
country. See Senate Doe. 974, 62d Cong. 3d sess., and Borchard, "State Indemnity
for Errors of Criminal Justice" (913) 3 Jour. Crim. Law 684.
"Riddoch v. State (1912) 68 Wash. 329, 123 Pac. 45a (injury through defec-
tive railing in State armory, though- leased for profit. See criticism in (1912)
74 CENT. L. JoUR., 431. Green v. State (1887) 73 Calif. 29, 11 Pac. 602,
14 Pac. 6Io; Billings v. State (igo2) 27 Wash. 288, 67 Pac. 583; Murdock Parlor
Grate Co. v. Commonwealth (I89o) 152 Mass. 28, z4N. E. 854; Houston v. State
(I898) 98 Wis. 481, 74 N. W. iii; Davis v. State (1917) 30 Idaho, 137, 163 Pac.
373. See Ann. Cas. 1913 E, io4i, note, and 13 A. L. R? 1276, note; Burroughs v.
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gone even further. By section 264 of the Code of Civil Procedure
27
the Court of Claims has jurisdiction "to hear and- determine a private
claim against the state, including a claim of an executor or. administrator
of a decedent who left him or her surviving a husband, wife or next of
kin, for damages for a wrongful act, neglect or default, on the part of
the state by which the decedent's death was caused . .. and the state
hereby consents, in all such claims, to have its liability determined."
Several courts had held that this statute expressly permitted liability
for a "wrongful act, neglect or default" of an agent or officer of the
State to be charged against the State. Not so the Court of Appeals.
While admitting that this statute conferred "jurisdiction of the broadest
character," Justice McLaughlin, speaking for the Court,2 8 said that
though the state "must be treated as having waived its immunity against
actions as to all private claims," still, by waiving its immunity from
action it did not thereby concede liability for the tort$, of its officers.
"Immunity from action is one thing. Immunity from liability for the
torts of its officers and agents is another."2 9  The Illinois Court of
Claims Act of June 25, 1917 empowers that Court "to hear and deter-
mine all claims and demands, legal and equitable, ex contractu" and
ex delicto which the State, as a sovereign Commonwealth, .should, in
equity and good -conscience, discharge and pay." This provision was
likewise held not to .enlarge the liability of the State, but "simply pro-
vides a remedy by which claims may be heard, and this Court has no
power' to make an award in any case unless the facts show a legal or
equitable claim against the State."2 0  While torts of officers- have not
Commonwealth (1916) 224 Mass. 28, i12 N. E. 492. See also United States v.
Irwin 0887) 127 U. S. x25, 8 Sup. Ct 1033, and United States v. Cum-
ruing (1889) 130 U. S. 452, 9 Sup. Ct. 583, where the same narrow construc-
tion was given to a Congressional waiver of the immunity from suit. Nor was
any different rule applied where the statute provided that "actions may be
instituted against the state under the same rules and regulations that govern
actions between private persons." Clark v. State (-869, Tenn.) 7 Caldw. 306;
State v. Hill (1876) 54 Ala. 67 (railroad operated by State).
' Now see. 2 of the Court of- Claims Act, as amended by N. Y. Laws, 292o,
ch. 482.
'Smith v. State of New York (292o) 227 N. Y. 405, 409, 125 . E. 841, 842.
Hogan and Crane, JJ., dissented. Neither Cardozo, J., nor Pound, J., sat.
' One is reminded of the late Prof. Burdick's comment on another decision of
the Court of Appeals, Seligman v. Friedlander (i92o) igg N. Y. 373, 92 N. E.
[o47, in holding that "jointly and severally" in the Partnership Law, meant only
"jointly." "Undoubtedly, section six of the Partnership Act must now be
accepted by litigants in this State to nMean not what it says, but what the learned
Court of Appeals says that it says. For that court possesses all the authority
over the meaning of words which Humpty Dumpty claimed for himself in
Alice Through the Looking-Glass. 'When I use a word,' said he, 'it means just
what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less." Joint and Several Liability
of Partners (I9gi) ii CoL. L. R-v. ioi-ii9.
" Thompson v. State (921) 4 IlL Ct. Cl. 26; Schmitt v. St., I ibid. 76.
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been held to create a legal or equitable claim, the -Court has in a con-
siderable number of cases recommended to the legislature an appropria-
tion as a matter of "social justice."31
It will be apparent how deeply settled is the conviction that only by
the most specific language will the legislature be able to impose upon the
State liability in tort.3 2 Indeed, when the California legislature made
an appropriation to pay compensation to an individual injured by a tort
of its prison officials, the statute was held unconstitutional as a "gift"
to a private individual.33 So where the use and occupation of land. for
a lighthouse by governmental officials might have been regarded as a
taking of land for public use under the constitution and clause one of
the Tucker Act of 1887, the Supreme Court preferred to consider it --
a tort under clause four, with resulting immunity from suit.34 A more
liberal construction is given in Canada and Australia and in other
British Colonies35 to general statutes conferring jurisdiction over private
claims against the state, but it is not at all certain that the United States
Court of Claims would not have denied liability in tort even if the
Tucker Act of 1887 had not expressly excluded from its jurisdiction
" Watkins v. State (1921) 4 Ill. Ct. CL 81; Bailey v. St., 4 ibid. 191; Abney
v. St. (i921) 4 ibid. i58; McGhee v. State (921) 4 ibid. 144.
"' In the Smith case, the claimant fell over a negligently placed wire strung
on posts in a State Reservation at Niagara, from which some revenue was
derived. The decision probably overrules sdme previous cases, in which recovery
in tort had been allowed as if an individual or corporation had been the defend-
ant; e g, Burke v. State of New York (I9og, N. Y. Ct. C.) 64 Misc. 558, *here
the injury arose out of the maintenance by the State of an inclined railway at
Niagara Falls. In Arnold v. State of New York (1914, 3d Dept.) 148 N. Y.
Supp. 479, 163 App. Div. 253, several claimants were killed or injured by the
negligent operation of an automobile racing car at races conducted at a state fair.
A writer in (92o) 5 CoRa. L. QuART. 34o, commenting on the Smith case-and
the conclusion that the Court of Claims had jurisdiction "to hear and determine"
without imposing liability asks if it was designed to permit the claimant- merely
"to amuse himself." See also 5 CORN. L. QUART. 78-84. In California, a statute
'giving a privilege of bringing suit "-on contract or for negligence" was construed
not to authorize liability for torts of officers. Denning v. State (1899) 123 Calif.
316, 55 Pac. lOoo.
"Bourn -v. Hart (1892) 93 Calif. 32i, 28 Pac. 95, though it was admitted that
by a general law the state could assume liability for torts. See the language
-used by the court in Brown v. State (I93, 3d- Dept.) 198 N. Y. Supp., 773, 2o6
App. Div. 634 (giving-the Court jurisdiction over the claim of the executor of a
juror in a state trial who had contracted a fatal illness through negligence of a
court officer) to the effect that the legislature could not create a legal liability if
the general rules of law recognized none. This is an exceptional view and is not
generally entertained, certainly with respect to injuries admittedly torts.
"4Hill v. United States (i893) i49 U. S. 593, 13 Sup. Ct. 10I.
" See Farnel v. Bowman (1887) L R. 12 A. C. 643 (New South Wales stat-
ute); Attorney General-v. Wemyss (1888) L. R. 13 A. C. 192 (Straights Set-
tlements). Negligence on public works in Canada, sec. 20 of Excheqluer Court
Act. Larose v. Rex (I9o) 3 Can. Sup. Ct. 206 and Audette, Practice of the
Exchequer Court of Canada (2d ed. 19o) O4, 115. See also infra.
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claims "sounding in tort." Special statutes have occasionally been con-
strued to admit the State's liability for torts of its agents or officers.
36
The distinction between governmental and corporate functions, though
not logically applicable to activities of the State, at least according to
the Anglo-American theory, has nevrertheless been occasionally invoked
by the courts to deny liability for the torts of particular officers engaged
in what the court called governmental functions.8 7  Constitutional pro-
visions in four states prohibit any suits against the State38 though this
does not prevent the legislature from appointing a Board of Claims to
pass upon claims, with recommendations to the legislature. In some
twenty states39 suits against the State are constitutionally authorized,
but with possibly two exceptions these provisions are not self-execu-
ting,40 and in only a few of the states has the necessary legislation been
passed. In most cases, the determination of the Board of Claims is
'See Sandel v. State (1922) x15 S. C. x68, 104 S. E. 567, 1i9 S. E. 776;
(1924) 33 YALE. LAw JOURNAL, 432; (1924) 9 CORN. L. QUART. 355 (death caused
by impure vaccine furnished by the State). The Court rejected the argument that
the State in furnishing vaccine was a charitable or eleemosynary institution and
exempt. See the dissenting opinion, ri9 S. E. 788. But see Apfelbacher v. State
(i9x5) i6o Wis. 565, x52 N. W. x44. The New York Canal Acts provided for
liability for negligence. Sipple v. State (1885) 99 N. Y. 2&4, I N. E. 892 and 13
A. L. R. 1281. See also cases arising out of negligence in operating canals in
Illinois. Holmes v. State (i9o5) i Ill. Ct. Cl. 324. See also special statute in
Lorich v. State (1920) 184 N. Y. Supp. 88.
31 Green v. New York (1919, N. Y. S. C.) 107 Misc. 557 (collision with auto-
mobile, driven by chauffeur employed by Cornell University); McAuliffe v. New
York (i919, N. Y. S. C.) 107 Misc. 553, 176 N. Y. Supp. 679 (negligence of state
physician in vaccinating a militiaman) ; Schwab v. State (1921) 4 Ill. Ct. Cl. 77
(conducting State Hospital for the Insane); Ryan v. State (1921) 4 ibid. 57
(Joliet Prison) ; Green v. State (192) 4 ibid. 9 (a public park).
'Alabama, Arkansas, Illinois, West Virginia. See references to constitutional
provisions in Index Digest of State Constitutions, Legislative Drafting Research
Fund (i915) x36o. In Illinois, a Board called Court of Claims was established
in 1917; its function is advisory to the legislature. For the history of relief
against the State in Illinois, see Bulletin Io, Constitutional Convention of Illi-
nois, I92O, compiled by Legislative Reference Bureau, Springfield, Ill., p. 864.
See Alabama Industrial School v. Addler (igo5) I44 Ala. s55, 42 So. 1i6.
" These states are Arizona, California, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Indiana,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oregon. Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Washington,
Wisconsin, Wyoming. See references to constitutional provisions in Index
Digest of State Constitutions, supra note 38, 136o-I36i. Arizona and California
permit by statute suits for negligence, but the few cases decided deny liability on
this ground. In most of the states that permit suit, it is either expressly limited
to contracts, or it is left in broad terms which the courts have usually construed
to exclude liability in tort. In the absence of constitutional provision for or
against, the legislature undoubtedly has the power to make the State liable for
the torts of its officers.
"Randabaugh v. State (917) 96 Ohio St. 513, 1i8 N. E. io2, appeal dismissed
(1918) 248 U. S. 32, 39 Sup. Ct. x6.
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recommendatory only, requiring a legislative appropriation. This is
true also where the determination is final, as in the case of the United
States Court of Claims, but no one could seriously object to the inade-
quacy of such form of declaratory judgment, which indeed in practice
has rarely, if ever, been refused satisfaction by the legislature. Certainly,
the judicial method of determining the validity of claims is far prefer-
able to the customary appeal to the legislature, with its political .implica-
tions. In this respect, we have long lagged behind England where
the sovereign immunity from suit was at least accompanied by legal
machinery, by petition of right, for trying judicially certain types of
cases.
WHEN SUIT AGAINST OFFICER IS CONSIDERED SUIT AGAINST STATE
In the light of the limited jurisdiction of the courts over claims
against the State and the wider range of liability- of officers, especially
in respect of torts, it becomes important to determine when a suit against
an officer is in reality a suit against the state and within its protective
immunity. Inasmuch as the state can act only through officers, it
would always be possible to implead the state in the guise of -its officer
were the courts not careful to maintain proper criteria between personal
acts and acts in the name of the state. This the courts have attempted
to do, but a survey of their effort in this direction is hardly convincing
of the existence or soundness of the alleged principles they assume to
adopt. In a general way, the distinctions sought to be maintained in
England between acts of government and administrative or corporate
acts, which lie at the basis of the rules of public liability in the
countries of continental Europe and in our law of municipal corpora-
tions, respond more nearly, though by no means satisfactorily, to logical
tests than do the distinctions made in American law. Thus, in England,
an effort is made to find whether the officer or corporate body created
for the accomplishment of a public service is an emanation of the Crown
in its governmental capacity or a subordinate officer, board, or body
carrying on ministerial or "corporate" work as a substithte for private
enterprise. The distinctions made are not satisfactory, for into the
determination enter considerations of the historical origin, private or
public, of the board "or body or 'function, and its operation in the local
as opposed to the national interest and the nature of its control j41 but even
these tests are inadequate, for at one time education, 2 sanitation,43 rail-
See Moore, Liability for Acts of Public Servants 0o907) 23 L. QUART.
REV 12 and the brilliant article of Mr. Laski, The Responsibility of the State iii
England (igig) 32 HARV. L. REv. 447.
Regina v. Temple (I852, Q. B.) 2 E. & B. 16o (liable for taxes); County
Council of Durham v. Assessment Committee [I89i] I Q. B. 330 (taxes). The
local education authorities i n England are now liable for the torts of their
officers and agents. Morris v. Carnarvon County Council [191o] I K. B. 840;
Smith v. Martin [1911] 2 K. B. 775. Thus, England goes much further than the
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way" and telegraph" service were under private control and yet their
present governmental directors are covered by the immunity and con-
structive infallibility of the Crown. On the other hand, the duty of
lighting and buoying the coasts of- England,
46 or managing the docks
and harbors,i 7 is probably a governmental function, yet the boards to
whom by statute those duties have been delegated are made liable for the
United States in assuming governmental responsibility for torts of employees,
e. g. teachers.
Sanitary Commissioners of Gibraltar v. Orfila (i89 o,P. C.) I5 A. C. 4o0
(under the statute creating the health board, it was thought that it was not
intended to hold them liable for the c6llapse, due to defective construction, of an
overhanging road built by them).
"Regina v. McLeod (1883) 8 Can. Sup. Ct. I; Reg. v. Macfarlane (1882) 7
Can. Sup. Ct 216 (Canadian Government railways operated by the Minister of
Railways, not lidble as common carriers). See criticism of these cases in a
note by Charles Morse in (1917) 53 CAN. L. JouM. 281-289, and in 35 Dom. L. R.
285. Since 1887 the. Crown in Canada subjects itself to the jtirisdiction of the
Exchequer Court on "every claim against the Crown arising out of any death
or injury to the pIerson or to property on any public work, resulting from the
negligence of any officer or servant of the Crown, while acting within the scope
of his duties or employment. Letourneux v. The Queen (1903) 33 Sup. Ct 339;
Miller v. The Grand Trunk Railway Co. [i9o6] A. C. 187. Gilchrist v. The
Queen (i8gi Can.) : Exch. 300; Anderson v. Rex (1920) 20 ibid. 22; Leclerc
v. Rex (192o) 20 ibid. 236; Windsor & Annapolis R. Co. v. Regina (1886) 11
A. C. 6o7 and Audette, The practice of the Exchequer Court of Canada (2d ed.
19o9) 115 et seq. Where a separate board was organized to operate the railways
in Victoria, liability was imposed. Sweeney v. Board of Land and Works (1878)
4 Vic. L. R. 44o. In New South Wales, the Railway Commissioners are sued,
but are indemnified by the State. Saunders v. The Railway Commissioners
(1920) 21 N. S. W. 7. In the British Colonies, owing to the fact that many
enterprises had to be undertaken and operated by the Government, it is quite
common to.permit the Petition of Right to cover injuries to the subject sounding
in tort. See Sir Barnes Peacock in Farnell v. Bowman (1887) 12 A. C. 643, 649.
"Bainbridge v. Postmaster General [19o6] i K. B. 178. Probably in no country
of Western Europe to-day would the State be considered not liable for torts of
its officers and employees in the health, railroad and telegraph services. See
infra. The immunity of the postmaster for torts of his subordinates was first
declared in Lane v. Cotton (1701, K. B.) i Ld. R. (Holt, C.J., dissenting) partly
on the ground that the function was governmental and that the subordinate,
though appointed by the defendant Postmaster, was himself an officer of
the Crown, and that the doctrine of respondeat superior was inapplicable. This
was followed in Whitfield v. Le Despencr (1778, K. B.) 2 Cowp. 754. This
doctrine has been accepted in the United States, beginning with Keenan v. South-
worth .(1872) 11o Mass. 474, but the immunity of the postmaster is limited to
torts committed by subordinates who are themselves public officers appointed by
the Government, and not to such -persons as may be his personal employees and
receive compensation from him alone. Raisler v. Oliver (1892) 97 Ala. 710,
12 So. 238. The failure to maintain this distinction has resulted in much con-
fusion in our courts. See the article of Emlin McClain, Liability in Tort of
Carriers of the Mail (1914) 14 CoI L. Rv. 632.
Gilbert v. Corporation of Trinity House (1886) L. R. 17 Q. B. Div. 795.
" Mersey Docks v. Gibbs (1866) L. R. i H. L. 93.
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torts of their employees. Yet separate incorporation does not afford a
genuine test, for we find that the Secretary of State for India in Council,
the Postmaster-General, the Commissioners of Public Works and Build-
ings, the Guardians of the Poor, though organized as corporations, are
nevertheless Government agents and protected by its immunities."
8
Indeed, the same official, like the Secretary of State'for India, may for
purposes of government, e. g., the distribution of war booty, escape
liability49 and yet, as successor to the corporate functions of the East
India Company he may be subject to liability.50 Again, our confusion
is increased by the knowledge that when Parliament incorporates these
bodies for the performance of public functions, such as harbor or
sanitary commissoners, it may decide whether or not it will extend to
them the shield of the Crown or subject them to 'the duties and liabili-
ties of private corporations, so that in each case an examination of the
organizing charter or statute may become necessary. 51 It is not less
disconcerting to find that for some purposes, such as immunity from
taxes or costs, a particular board or body enjoys sovereign privileges
and exemptions, whereas in the matter of liability for breach of contract
or tort in does not.5 2  Nor does it restore our confidence to find that, as
in Graham v. Public Works Commissioners,53 the question of their suabil-
ity for breach of contract turns upon whether they made the contract for
themselves or on behalf of the Crown; and after finding that the erection
of a public post office was contracted for by the board "for themselves",
'Kinloch v. Secretary of State for India (i88o) 15 Ch. Div. i (though he
may be the person in whose name the government of India sues and is sued);
Roper v. Public Works Commissioners [1915] I K. B. 45, 52 (no liability in
tort) ; Bainbridge v. Postmaster General, supra note 45, not liable in tort.
Dunbar v. The Guardians of the Poor of the Ardee Union [1897, C. A.] 2 Ir.
Rep. 76, 88 (poor law guardians not liable in tort). FitzGibbon, L.J., thought,
logically, that the immunity in tort should extend not merely to "emanations
from the Crown" or the great officers of State, but to "every public department."
So individuals sued in their official capacity may be protected by the shield of
the Crown. Raleigh v. Goschen [1898] I Ch. 73 (First Lord and Lords Com-
missioners of the Admiralty).
' Kinloch v. Secretary of State for India, supra note 48.
'P. & 0: Steam Navigation Co. v. Secretary of State for India (186i) 5
Bom. H. C. R. Appendix I; see also Jelanger M. Cursetji v. Secretary of State
for India (i9o2) L. R. Bom. i89, 197, and Ilbert, The Government of India (3d
ed. 1915) 170.
"'Mersey Docks v. Gibbs, supra note 47; Sanitary Commissioners of Gibraltar
v. Orfila, supra note 43; Dunbar v. The Guardians of the Poor, supra note 48.
=Regina v. McCann (1868, Exch.) L. R. 3 Q. B. 677 (Commissioners of Works
and Buildings) taxes; Re Woods Estate (1886) 31 Ch. Div. 6o7, 621 (costs) ;
Graham v. Public Works Commissioners [I9OX] 2 K. B. 781 (damages for breach
of contract allowed; declaratory judgment). England has also developed a
desirable practice of permitting the suit in tort to proceed against the officer, and
then paying the judgment out of the Treasury. Dixon v. Farrer (I886) L. R. 17
Q. B. Div. 658 (detention of ship erroneously thought to be unseaworthy).
' Supra, note 52.
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making them suable,-though we are told that a public officer cannot
be made liable on contracts made by -him for the public servicek---never-
theless no execution can issue because their property is Crown property.
Nor are our difficulties relieved by the distinctions sought to be made in
England and in some cases in this country between the misfeasance
and nonfeasance of officers, the former carrying liability, the latter
immunity.55
The effort of the British courts to reconcile the immunity of the
Crown from suit in tort with the liability of public officers resulted in
the attempt to find a line of division between acts of the Crown or
government, which covered with the mantle of immunity the officers
through whom such acts must perforce be accomplished, and tortious
non-governmental or "corporate" acts of the individual officer or body,
which were not protected by the shield of the Crown. We have seen
that this separation, involving also a denial of the principle of respon-
deat superior in official "governmental" relations, and other manifesta-
tions of solicitude for superior officers, has resulted practically in limit-
ing the recourse of the injured citizen, even where he could sue, to an
action against subordinate and usually irresponsible minor officials,
which in practical effect was not far removed from a denial of relief
of any kind.56
In the United States, with unimportant and disputed exceptions,
57
even so much of a scientific effort as is involved in separating "govern-
mental" from "corporate" acts cannot be discovered in the attempt to
reconcile State immunity with official responsibility, though such an
effort has been made in determining the liability of municipal corpora-
tions and occasionally, but without substantial merit, of corporations or
boards organized to perform particular state functions. In State rela-
tions, the effort to apply the inhibitions of the Eleventh Amendment
in the federal courts has resulted in a haphazard application of tests to
determine merely when a suit directed against an officer or corporate
body existing by state authority is in reality a suit against the State.
That effort has been much complicated by the necessity of reconciling
the immunity from suit secured by the Eleventh Amendment with the
constitutional prohibitions upon the states against impairing the obli-
"Dunn v. Macdonald [1897] i Q. B. 4or, 555. Palmer v. Hutchinson (i881,
H. L.) 6 A. C. 619; Hodgson v. Dexter (i8o3, U. S.) i Cranch, 345.
These distinctions will be considered when we deal with the torts of municipal
corporations.
'The officer in England enjoys further privileges, e. g. the six-months' statute
of limitations of the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893, exemption on exe-
cution of salary and pengion, etc. See The Danube II [1921] Prob. 183. Emden,
The Cizil Servant in the Law and the Constitution (1923) 34 et seq. and Emden,
The Scope of the Public Authorities Protection Act 1893 (923) 39 L. QuiT.
REv. 341. Chartres, The Public Authorities Protection Act (1912) 1893.
" Supra, note 37.
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gation of contract and against depriving any person of life, liberty
or property without due process of law under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
The construction of the Eleventh Amendment first came before the
Supreme Court in Osborn v. The United States Bank,58 when Marshall
decided that the Eleventh Amendment was inapplicable unless the State
was a party to the record. That construction would have nullified the
Amendment and it had to be rejected, as it was in Poindexter v. Green-
how,-9 where the rule was adopted that the question as to whether the
state is being sued is to be determined, not by the nominal parties to the
record, but by consideration of the effect upon the state of the judg-
ment or decree to be rendered, and of the real repository of the adverse
interest, the state or officer personally, against whom the decree would
effectively operate.6 0 If the state is the real party in interest or an
indispensable party to enable the court to grant the relief sought, though
an officer is the defendant, the suit cannot lie, except, as we shall see,
to restrain an officer from seeking to enforce an unconstitutional state
law. Thus, if the object of the suit against an officer is to compel a
specific performance of the state's contract,61 or to obtain possession of
property of which the state claims title and possession,62 or to compel
(T824, U. S.) 9 Wheat. 739.
(1884) 114 U. S. 270, 286, 5 Sup. Ct. 903.
°'In re Ayers (1887) 123 U. S. 443, 487, 8 Sup. Ct. 164. See the latest expres-
sion of the Supreme Court's view in this regard in In re State of New York
(1921) 256 U. S. 49o 41 Sup. Ct. 588, 5§o. Suits against high officials, acting in
their official capacity as representatives of the State, are thus often held to be
merely suits against the State: Georgia v. Sundry African Slaves (1828, U. S.)
i Pet. iio; Kentucky v. Dennison (i86o, U. S.) 24 How. 66 (Governor of a
state). But see Davis v. Gray (1872, U. S.) 16 Wall. 203, questioned in Cun-
ningham v. Macon (1883) iog U. S. 446, 3 Sup. Ct. 292. Hodgson v. Dexter
(1803, U. S.) i Cranch, 345, 363 (Secretary of War). As to state treasurer, etc.,
see notes 63 and 64. See in general, 44 L. R. A. 189, note, and io8 Amer. St.
Rep. 83o, note.
'Hagood v. Southern (1886) 117 U. S. 52, 6 Sup. Ct. 6o8; North Carolina v.
Temple (18go) 134 U. S. 22, io Sup. Ct. 509; Louisiana v. lumel (1882) I 7
U. S. 711, 2 Sup. Ct. 128; In re Ayers, supra; Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co.
(1913) 213 U. S. 151, 29 Sup. Ct. 458; Miller v. State Board (x899) 46 W. Va.
192, 32 S. E. ioo7. The distinction between these cases and those in which the
constitutional rights of citizens under contracts with states are protected in
equity, as in Allen v. Baltimore and Ohio R. R. (1884) 114 U. S. 311, 316, 5 Sup.
Ct. 925, 962, has been explained on the theory that the former were political acts
of the state and the latter civil or judicial. See Pilling, The Eleventh Amend-
ment (1917) 15 Mici. L. Rnv. 468, 475- This explanation is not very helpful in
resolving doubts and classifying cases.
Cunningham v. Macon, etc. (1883) iog U. S. 446, 3 Sup. Ct. 292; Christian
v. IV. C. Railroad (I8go) 133 U. S. 233, IO Sup. Ct. 260; Stanley v. Schwalby
(1896) 162 U. S. 255, 16 Sup. Ct. 754. This was held to apply to libels in ren
in admiralty, where the vessel libelled was, when the injury was done, under
charter to the state, and in charge of its superintendent of public works against
whom an action in personam was joined. In re State of New York (1921) 256
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an officer to pay money out of the state treasury,6
3 or to prevent the
state from using its own property or property which it claims as its
own,"4 the federal courts decline jurisdiction. But when the -State
comes into the market place and engages in business, it might be sup-
posed that it rendered itself subject to law and the usual iegal relations.
Yet while the Supreme Court has recognized this distinction with respect
to corporations chartered and partly owned by the State,
5 and also in
permitting the Federal Government to tax the liquor business conducted
by the State of South Carolina,"" it declined to subject the State
liquidators of that liquor business to suit without the State's consent.
7
The North Dakota Supreme Court had greater temerity in subjecting
that State to suit in respect of the business enterprises conducted by that
state,0 s even in the absence of an express statute, but this rather coura-
geous judicial legislation has not escaped academic condemnation.
69
U. S. 490, 41 Sup. 588, the doctrine of State immunity overriding a settled rule
of admiralty. In Workman v. New York City (1900) 179 U. S. 552, 21 Sup. Ct.
212, almost an identical suit against the city of New York was allowed.
'Louisiana v. Jumel, supra note 61; Smith v. Reeves (1899) 178 U. S. 436,
20 Sup. Ct. gig. See also Flagg v. Bradford (i902) 181 Mass. 315, 63 N. E. 898.
-Recently an action against the State Banking Board and the Banking Commis-
sioner of Oklahoma to compel payments from the Depositors' Guaranty Fund,
established by the legislature, was held to be a suit against the State. Lankford
v. Platte Iron Works Co. (1915) 235 U. S. 461, 35 Sup. Ct. 173; (i16) 64
U. PA. L. Rav. 320 (four justices dissented). But see Allen, Bank Cominmis-
sioner v. United States (1923, C. C. A. ist) 285 Fed. 678, 682, where it was held
that a suit against a bank commissioner to establish a claim against an insolvent
bank, of which he had taken charge, was not a suit against the state. If the
money had not yet gotten into the State Treasury, suit against the State Treas-
urer for illegally retained funds would lie. United States v. Peters (i8o U. S.)
5 Cranch, II5.
"Belknap v. Schild (1895) 161 U. S. io, 16 Sup. Ct 443; International Postal'
Supply Co. v. Bruce (i9o4) 194 U. S. 6oi, 24 Sup. Ct. 82o. In Oregon v. Hitch-
cock (i9o6) 202 U. S. 6% 26 Sup. Ct 568, the object unsuccessfully sought was
to restrain the Secretary of the Interior from patenting to individuals certain
public lands, the plaintiff state claiming title.
United States v. Planters" Bank of Georgia (1824, U. S.) 9 Wheat. 904.
Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky (1837, U. S.) ixi Pet. 257. But see infra.
'South Carolina v. United States (19o5) 1gg U. S. 437, 26 Sup. Ct. iio.
6Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co. (io9) 213 U. S. 151, 29 Sup. CGt-458. See
(igo8) 21 HARv. L Rnv. 289 on the decision below, 164 Fed. i, which &6 Supreme
Court reversed.
MSargent County v. State (i92i, N. Dak.) i82 N. W. 27o. That this would be
the decision in the countries of western Europe, except England, on the ground
that it involves acts of gestion (in France) or of the fiscus (in Germany) is hardly
to be doubted. The increasing participation of government in business makes
the question important; recognition of that fact accounts for the provisions in
much of the inodern legislation, as in fact in North Dakota (in certain respects),
in the Federal Railroad Control Act of igi8 (United States Railroad Admin-
istration), and in the Merchant Marine Acts of igi6 and i920 permitting the
Government to be sued, in specified ways. See Western & Atlantic R. R. v.
Carlton (i85o) 28 Ga. i8o (railroad owned by State of Georgia). Yet in the
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The Supreme Court has on numerous occasions enjoined or manda-
mused high officials of the state'in the performance of acts which,
violative of the private rights of citizens, were regarded as ministerial
in- character.70 That many of the acts thus enjoined or mandamused
are in reality state acts, for example, the compulsory levy of taxes to
pay state bonds, is hardly to be doubted, but if the court finds that the
duty is owed to the plaintiff and -is sought to be evaded whether by
authority of an invalid state law or otherwise, it has no hesitation in
directing the state officer to perform his legal duty, though even in such
cases an action for damages, at least against higher officials, will not be
entertained.
71
Not the least of the difficulties of reconciling the Eleventh with the
Fourteenth Amendment and other constitutidnal inhibitions on the
State has lain in the attempt to show that in enjoining or subjecting
to other suit the State officer acting under a statute violating the con-
stitutional rights of the citizen ufnder the Fourteenth Amendment, the
State itself was not being sued. The purported solution was furnished
by the reasonipg of Justice Matthews in Poindexter v. Greenhow,
72 in
which he drew a distinction between the government and the State. The
government, as the agent, can act validly only within, the scope of its
authority, the state and federal constitutions. When then it passes a
statute, under which an officer purports to act, which in fact is in viola-
tion of a constitutional limitation, the government'has exceeded its legal
absence of statute, subjection of the state to suit without consent must be
regarded as judicial legislation, and however commendable in result, challenges
a deeply-rooted, though long unjustified doctrine of Anglo-American law. Young
v. Steamship Scotia (1903, P. C.) 89 L. T. R 374. It is the object of these
articles to endeavor to bring about a repeal by legislation of the antiquated and
unjust rule of immunity in tort cases.
' (1922) 3g HAv. L RE-v. 335.
7 0Kendall'v. United States, ex rel. Stokes (1838, U. S.) 12 Pet. 524. (Manda-
mus against Postmaster General.) Board of Liqi'idation v. McComb (1875) 92
U. S. 531. Seibert v. Leis (1887) 122 U. S. 284, 7 Sup. Ct. 1790. Graham v.
Folsom (.i9o6) 2oo U. S. 248, 26 Sup. Ct. 245. Parish v. McVeagh (0909) 274
U. S. 124, 29 Sup. Ct. 556 (mandamus) and Houston v. Ormes (1920) 252 U. S.
469, 40 Sup. Ct. 369 (in equiiy to establish attorney's lien on claim allowed by the
Court of Claims) were suits against the Secretary of -the Treasury, but instituted
after Congress had made the necessary appropriation. Yet when the mandamus
sought to compel the Treasurer to take money out of the State Treasury to pay
certain coupons on bonds it was refused. Louisiana v. Jumel (1882) io7 U. S.
711, 2 Sup. Ct. 12.
Compare Kendall v. Stokes (1838, U. S.) 12 Pet. 5!4 with Stokes v. Kendall
(1845), U. S.) 3 How. 87, where the same act was held sufficiently ministerial to
warrant mndamus, but sufficiently discretionary to deny liability lor damages.
See 2 Goodnow, op. cit., 165 et seq.
0 (1884) 774 U. S. 270, 5 Sup. Ct 903. See this ultra vires argument, as
developed in state courts, in Clark v. State (1869, Tenn.) 7 Caldw. 3o6, 317, and
Louisville & Nashvills iailroad Co. v. Burr (i977) 63 F14. 491, 58 So. 543.
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powers and the officer is not protected by the statute against judicial
control by suit. The illegal act is not then the act of the State, but the
illegal personal act of the officer "who falsely speaks and acts in its
name." Whether or not it required this circuitous and perhaps specious
reasoning to enable the Supreme Court to protect the constitutional
rights of the individual against impairment by the State, it is never-
theless a fact that the Supreme Court has never hesitated to enjoin or
otherwise control the instrument or agent of the State acting under
an unconstitutional statute or, of course, acting unconstitutionally in
the execution of a valid statute.78
It may be well to recall here that the same argument of ultra vires
might, if admitted as applicable to the relation between the state and
its officer committing an illegal act, serve automatically to absolve the
state from all liability, for it is doubtless true that the state, even admit-
ting the power, never, or very rarely, authorizes a tort.7 4  Fortunately,
this plea of ultra vires has not been admitted in this relation, any more
than it has in the case of corporations, including municipal corporations,
generally, yet it has troubled the theory of state responsibility not a lit-
tle. Its effect is practically attained, of course, through the antiquated
doctrine of State immunity. and infallibility and the inapplicability
to the State of the usual rules of agency,7 5 leaving the officer, and then
only the most subordinate as a rule, to bear personally the consequences
of his mistake, negligence or misfeasance in the performance of official
duties, and leaving to the individual merely this often doubtful remedy.
Once regard the officer as the embodiment or organ of the State, then
all remedy for negligence disappears. The State's immunity from suit
covers the officer. While the remedy against the officer is generally
effective where its purpose is to recover specific property unlawfully
"Pennoyer v. McConnaughy (i8gi) 140 U. S. i, ii Sup. Ct. 699; Reagan v.
Farmers" Loan and Trust Co. (1894) 154 U. S. 362, 14 Sup. Ct. l047. In re
Young (1908) 209 U. S. 123, 28 Sup. Ct. 441. See (19o8) 21 HARv. L. REv. 527.
Greene, Auditor v. Louisville & Interurban Railway Co. (1917) 244 U. S. 499,
37 Sup. Ct. 673. In the Reagan case, the action, rather than the statute, was
unconstitutional. The same principle applies to state boards acting illegally.
U. S. v. MlcCallurn et al., State Board of Harbor Commissioners of Calif. (1922,
N. D. Cal.) 281 Fed. 834. See also the cases listed in 25 R. C. L. 415, note 2o.
Justice McReynolds believes that the attempt to enjoin the enforcement of a
criminal statute of a state is a suit against the state, and protests against refining
away, as he calls it, the provisions of the Eleventh Amendment.. See his dis-
senting opinion in Truax v. Raich (1915) 239 U. S. 33, 36 Sup. Ct 7.
' In Feather v. Regina (1865, K. B.) 6 B. & S. 257, 295, 122 Eng. Rep. 1191,
12o5, Cockburn, C.J., indeed said: "From the maxim that the King can do no
wrong, it follows, as a necessary consequence, that the King cannot authorize
a wrong!'
" Story, Agency, 9th ed., sec. 3i9; Gibbons v. U. S. (1868, U. S.) 8 Wall. 269,
274; Clodfelter v. State (I882) 86 N. C. 51; State v. Hill (1876) 54 Ala. 67;
Langford v. U. S. (1879) 108 U. S. 341; Billings v. State (19o2) 27 Wash. 288,
67 Pac. 583.
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withheld by the officer and not claimed by the State,7 6 and where the
action of the officer can be controlled by injunction, mandamus or other
coercive relief, as in the cases already mentioned, its effectiveness in an
action for damages is, of course, limited to the pecuniary responsibility
of the wrong-doing official, who is not, except in rare cases, protected
by an order, if actually illegal, emanating from a superior executive
officer.77 The practical requirement, thus enforced, that the subordi-
nate officer assume the risk of the constitutionality, legality and cor-
rectness of the orders of his superior officers alone demonstrates the
injustice and inequity of the existing rule as to all parties concerned-
the subordinate officer, the victim of the injury, and the State or pub-
lic which employs all officers. It is flagrantly defective social engineer-
ing.
The Supreme Court no longer seems to regard as important the
point once raised that if the act sought to be enjoined is not the state's
act, then the Fourteenth Amendment and the due process clause is not
involved, whereas if it is the state's act, then the Eleventh Amendment
interposes to deny jurisdiction.7 8  This point, raised in the Ayres case,
with respect to the effect of the Eleventh Amendment on the article pro-
hibiting the states from passing any law impairing the obligation of
contracts, has served to draw a distinction between the mere breach
of a contract, upon which suit will not be entertained against the State,
and the effect of the inhibited law, which will be treated as null and
void.7 0  The effort to reconcile the doctrine of such cases as Reagan v.
Farmers Loan & Trust Co.80 and ex parte Young,8 ' in which injunctions
were obtained against state attorneys-general from enforcing unconsti-
tutional rate statutes, with such cases as Fitts v. McGhee,s2 in which"
U S. v. Lee (1882) io6 U. S. 196, I Sup. Ct. 24o; Tindal v. Wesley (1897)
167 U. S. 204, 211, 221, 17 Sup.'Ct. 770, 773, 777; Scranton v. Wheeler (igoo)
179 U. S. 141, 152, 21 Sup. Ct. 48, 52. So a suit against the Secretary of War
to enjoin the removal of a bridge, as it involves the protection of property
rights, was regarded as not a suit against the United States. Philadelphia Co. v.
Stimsolt (1912) 223 U. S. 6a5, 32 Sup. Ct. 340; Delaware R. R. Co. v. Weeks
(1923, D. Del.) 293 Fed. 114.
nBates v. "Clark (1877) 95 U. S. 204, 2o9; Scott v. Donald (1896) 165 U. S.
58, 67, 17 Sup. Ct. 265, 266; Belknap v. Schild (1896) 161 U. S. io, 18, 26, 16
Sup. Ct. 443, 445, 448, 449. Johnson v. Lankford (1918) 245 U. S. 541, 546, 38
Sup. Ct. 203, (1918) 31 HARv. L. REv. 1O36. See also Elnore v. Fields (19o7)
153 Ala. 345, 45 So. 66; Burroughs v. Common. (1916) 224 Mass. 28, 112 N. E.
491, Ann. Cas. 1917 A 38; 25 R. C. L. 414.
S See Hadley, The Eleventh Amendment (19o8) 66 CENT. L. JOUR., 71, 75.
"In re Ayers (1887) 123 U. S. 443, 8 Sup. Ct. 164; Carter v. Greenhow (1884)
114 U. S. 370, 17 Sup. Ct. 928; Hays v. Port of Seattle (192o) 251 U. S. 233, 40
Sup. Ct. 125. See note 61 supra, as to suggested distinction between political and
judicial acts in connection with state contracts.
(1894) 154 U. S. 362, 14 Sup. Ct. 1047.
"(1908) 209 U. S. 123, 28 Sup. Ct. 441.
(899) 172 U. S. 516, ig Sup. Ct. 269.
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an injunction against an attorney-general to prevent the execution of
an act alleged to be unconstitutional, was denied, on the-ground that in
the former cases the officer sued was specially charged with enforcing
the unconstitutional act, whereas in the latter he was not necessarily so
charged but his name afforded the plaintiff merely a means for testing the
constitutionality of the statute, seems hardly convincing, or successful.
The alleged distinction had better be abandoned, as has the attempt, once
made, to find that the pecuniary or proprietary interests of the state
had to be involved in the forbidden suit and not the governmental."
It must be confessed that it is almost impossible to discover any guid-
ing principle for determining when a suit against an officer is a suit
against the State and most of those who have dealt with the subject
have contented themselves with an enumeration of the cases, without
for the most part any serious effort to educe an underlying principle or
criticize inconsistencies."4
CORPORATIONS EXERCISING PUBLIC POWERS
Though an officer of the State carrying out his official duties as the
agent of the State has on so many occasions been held to enjby its
immunity from suit, a somewhat different principle seems to prevail, at
least in the federal courts, when the Government instead of confiding
the performance of official duties to an individual or commission,
organizes a corporati6n for this purpose, or purchases all or a part of
the stock in such corporation. 5 The intermediate corporation, though
engaged in the performance of the most "governmental" of functions,
Compare Reagan v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., supra, with Missouri. v.
Illinois (19Ol) 180 U. S. 208, 21 Sup. Ct. 331, and Kansas v. Colorado (19o7) 2o6
U. S. 46, 27 Sup. Ct. 655. See also 2 Willoughby, Constitutional Law (igio)
sec. 625.
The more exhaustive discussions of this question will be found among the
following: 2 Willoughby, Constitutional Law, ch. LIV; Singewald, The Doctrine
of Non-Suability of the State in the United States (igio) ; Wintersteen, The
Eleventh Amendment and the Non-Suability of the State (I8qi) 30 Am. L. REG.
1-15; Trieber, Suability of States by Individuals in the Courts of the United
States (1907) 41 Am. L. Rav. 845-869.; Trickett, Suits against States by Indi-
viduals in the Federal Courts (907)- 41 Am. L. REv. 364-384; The Eleventh
Amendment, three articles by Guthrie in (19o8) 8 CoL. L. Rxv. 183-2o7, by Braxton
in the V.-,. B. A. RP,. for I907, 172-193 (mainly historical) and by Hadley
(i9o8) 66 CENT. L. JOUR. 71-76. See note in (1907) 7 CoL. L. Rav. and
extensive note to the case of Sanders v. Saxton (i9o5) 182 N. Y. 477, 75 N. E.
529, in io8 Am. St Rep. 86, 830-844. See an extensive note in 44 L. R. A.
(N. s.) 189-228.
' Bank of United States v. Planters" Bank of Georgia (1824, U. S.) 9 Wheat
904, 907; Bank of Kentucky v. Wister et al. (1829, U. S.) 2 Pet 318; Briscoe v.
Bank of Kentucky (1837, U. S.) ii Pet. 257; Salas v. United States (I916,
C. C. A. 2d) 234 Fed. 842; Panama Railroad Co. v. Curran (1919, C. C. A. 5th)
256 Fed. 768. See also Hall v. Wisconsin (188o) 103 U. S. 5, 1' (contract by
State with private individuals; State "regarded pro hac vice as a private person").
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seems here, as occasionally in England,
s to qualify the immutability of
the principle of State immunity from suit. To effect such a vital
difference by a mere change in the nature of the agent, individual or
corporate, might lead one to question the unchallengeable soundness
of the original theory of immunity. In the case of Bank of United
States v. Planters' Bank of Georgia, Chief Justice Marshall explained
this subjection of corporations to suit as follows:
"It is, we think, a sound principle, that when a government becomes
a partner in any trading company, it divests itself, so far as concerns the
transactions of that company, of its sovereign character, and takes that
of a citizen. Instead of communicating to the company its privileges
and its prerogatives, it descends to a level with those with whom it
associates itself, and takes the character which belongs to its associates
and to the business which is to be transacted.
' s
Yet even this result has not commanded uniform support from the
courts, for in the recent case of Ballaine v. Alaska Northern Railway
Co. (United States, intervener)
8 the Circuit Court of Appeals held that
the defendant railroad corporation, whose stock and property had been
purchased by the federal Government, and which was engaged in per-
forming governmental and public purposes, enjoyed the Government's
immunity for the torts of its agents. On the other hand, the United
States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, which was organ-
ized for the governmental building and operating of ships for the federal
government, all of whose stock was owned by the United States and
which entered into contracts "representing the United States of America"
was deemed not to enjoy the Government's immunity from suit (except
in the way prescribed by statute), but to be subject to suit like any other
corporation, and this, although all its expenses and deficits and even
judgments against it, are paid from Congres*sional appropriations.
8 9
This decision, rendered by Justice Holmes, the most vigorous defender
IMersey Docks Trustees v. Gibbs (1866) L. R. i H. L. 93, ii; Mersey Docks
Trustees v. Cameron (1864, H. L.) ii Eng. Rep. 443; Gilbert v. Trinity House
Corporation (1886) L. R. 17 Q. B. Div. 795. But in several cases incorporation
was deemed not to affect the sovereign character of the board or official or
department sued (see supra) so that in England it may fairly be said that incorpo-
ration, of itself is immaterial in determining the immunity of a particular body
from suit. See Roper v. Public Works Commissioners [1915] I K. B. 45.
" (1824, U. S.) 9 Wheat. 9o4, 9o7. See also the remarks of Lord Stowell in
The Swift (1813) i Dod. 320, 329, quoted by Mack, J., in his learned opinion in
The Pesaro (1921, S. D. N. Y.) 277 Fed. 473, 476. Cf. (1922) 35 HARV. L. REV.
330.
"(1919, C. C. A. 9th) 259 Fed. 183. See 8 A. L. R. 995, note.
Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. U. S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp. (I922)
258 U. S. 549, 42 Sup. Ct. 386, three justices dissenting. It had previously been
held that an inspector of the Fleet Corp. was not an "agent of the United States"
within the terms of a penal statute. United States v. Strang (1921) 254 U. S.
491, 41 Sup. Ct. i65; 21 COL. L. REv. 485. See also United States v. Walter
(1923) 263 U. S. 15, 44 Sup. Ct. IO; United States Grain Corporation v. Phillips
(1922) 261 U. S. io6, 43 Sup. Ct. 283.
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of the sanctity of the doctrine of State immunity,9 0 would seem to indi-
cate the vulnerability of the doctrine in the eyes of its most convinced
proponent; for it seems hardly reasonable that the mere intermediation
of a corporation organized and owned by the State for the performance
of a particular function of the Government should alter so settled a
principle as State immunity, a principle which is fully enforced when the
enterprise is conducted by a State official or commissionerl -- unless
indeed the conclusion is drawn, as we think it must be, that the doctrine
rests not on rational and substantial, but on antiquated and technical
grounds, and that the courts eagerly seek artificial methods of escape
from its implications. This seems the more apparent when it is observed
that the Supreme Court has had no hesitation in finding these corpora-
tions to be Governmental agencies and instrumentalities for the purpose
of escaping' the exercise upon them of the reserved powers of the
states, such as the taxing power, whether the Government owned all1 2
or only some"3 or none94 of the stock. In England, a more logical
result is attained by the conclusion that in determining whether or not
a particular body or official is a "servant of the Crown" and protected
by its shield from suit, the question of incorporation is really imma-
terial.9 5
The suability and liability of a corporation organized by authority
of a State to carry on some particular function of government is on the
whole decided in State courts on more logical grounds than in the
federal Supreme Court, though the conclusions are by no means uniform.
These courts seek to determine primarily whether the corporation is a
State agency acting without pecuniary profit or a private corporation
acting in private interests, and therefore exempt or not from suit.
" See Kawananakoa v. Polyblank (0905) 205 U. S. 349, 353, 27 Sup. Ct. 526,
527; The Western Maid, United States v. Thompson (1922) 257 U. S. 419, 433,
42 Sup. Ct. i59, I6I. These cases and the theory of Mr. Justice Holmes will
be discussed further infra.
' 1Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co. (i9o9) 213 U. S. 151, 29 Sup. Ct. 458.
"'Panama Railroad Co. v. Minnix (1922, C. C. A. 5th) 282 Fed. 47; IngramDay Lumber Co. v. United States .... Emergency Fleet Corp. (1920, S. D.Miss.) 267 Fed. 283. The United States Spruce Production Corporation, all ofwhose stock was owned by the United States Government, held exempt fromstate taxation: U. S. Spruce Production Corporation v. Lincoln County (1922,D. Or.) 285 Fed. 388. Callain County, Wash. v. United States (1923) 263 U. S.
341, 44 Sup. Ct. 12I.
"McCullough v. Maryland (1819, U. S.) 4 Wheat. 316, 407; Osborn v. United
States Bank (1824, U. S.) 9 Wheat. 738, 86o.
" Luxton v. North River Bridge Co. (894) 153 U. S. 525, 529, 14 Sup. Ct. 891,
892; First National Bank v. Union Trust Co. (1917) 244 U. S. 416, 425, 37
Sup. Ct. 734, 737; Smith v. Kansas City Title Co. (1921) 255 U. S. 18o, 208, 41
Sup. Ct. 243, 249.
"Bainbridge v. Postmaster-General [I9O6] I K. B. 178; Roper v. Public Works
Commissioners [2915] 1 K. B. 45, 52.
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Thus, actions against agricultural societies conducting state fairs,98
against state prisong,97 insane asylums, 9 8 hospitals,99 educational institu-
tions,100 or boards of education,10 ' state homes for disabled soldiers, 10 2
"Morrison v. MacLaren (1915) 16o Wis. 621, 152 N. W. 475; L. R. A. 1915 E,
469, note; Zoeller v. State Board of Agriculture (1915) 163 Ky. 446, 173 S. W.
1143; Minear v. State Board of Agriculture (913) 259 Ill. 549, 2O2 N. E. lo82,
Ann. Cases 1914 B, 229o, and cases there cited. The fact that the statute enables
these corporations to sue and be sued, was held not to enlarge their substantive
liability. But 'see contra: Dunn v. Brown County Agricultural Society (1888) 46
Ohio St. 93, 18 N. E. 496; Lane v. Minnesota State Agr. Soc. (1895) 52 Minn.
175, 64 N. W. 382 (under a statute subsequently amended) ; see also Berman v.
Same (1904) 93 Minn. 125, IOO N. W. 732.
Where the state is sued directly the immunity is, of course, the more clear.
Melvin v. State of California (1898) 121 Calif. 16, 53 Pac. 416. The case of
Arnold v. State (1914, 3d Dept.) 163 App. Div. 253, 148 N. Y. Supp. 479, rests
upon a statute, sec. 264 of the late Code of Civil Procedure, which allowed a claim
against the state for a "wrongful act, neglect or default." The plain words of
this statute have been construed into comparative meaninglessness by the Court of
Appeals in Smith v. New York (1920) 227 N. Y. 405, 125 N. E. 841, supra note 16,
although where the wrongful act caused death and not a lesser injury it would
seem that the claim must lie.
"Moody v. State Prison (igoi) 128 N. C. 12, 38 S. E. 131. (Non-suability as
state agency.) But see Trevett v. Prison Asso. (29oo) 98 Va. 332, 36 S. E. 373,
where the statute of incorporation was deemed to give it a more private character.
The issue whether it is a governmental non-profit association or a private corpora-
tion will often turn upon the statute.
" Leavell v. West Kentucky Asylum for the Insane (29o6) 122 Ky. 2i3, 91 S. W.
671; yet, while it could not be sued in tort, as a state agency, a suit to abate a
nuisance, a preventive remedy, was allowed against such an asylum. Herr v.
Central Kentucky Lunatic Asylum (895) 97 Ky. 458, 30 S. W. 971.
'"White v. Alabama Insane Hospital (1903) 138 Ala. 479, 35 So. 454; Maia v.
Eastern State Hospital (1899) 97 Va. 507, 34 S. E.. 617.1"Abston v. Waldon Academy (29o6) 118 Tenn. 24, 202 S. W. 351; Alabama
Girls Industrial School v. Reynolds (195o) 143 Ala. 579, 42 So. 114; Same v.
Addler (195o) 144 Ala. 555, 42 So. 116 (held immune from suit, under Alabama
constitution, notwithstanding creating statute which enabled it "to sue and be
sued"). Oklahoma Agr. and M. College v. Willis (1898) 6 Okla. 593, 52 PaC. 921.
See (292o) 5 CORN. L. QUART. 78. But see Medical College v. Rushing (1907)
i Ga.-App. 468, 57 S. E. 1O83; Dunn v. University of Oregon (1881) 9 Or. 357
(title to property in issue) ; and Scott v. Univ. of Michigan A. A. (1908) 152
Mich. 684, 116 N. W. 624, where it was held that in running a football game, the
University was engaged in a "corporate or private" function and liable in tort.
So a state university may be sued for salary, merely because it was a corporation.
University of Illinois v. Bruner (1898) 175 Ill. 307, 51 N. E. 687; Ward v. State
Agricu'tural College (1905, C. C. A. 8th) 138 Fed. 372.
In Hopkins v. Clemnson College (1910) 221 U. S. 636, 31 Sup. Ct. 654, the
Supreme Court, under its general view that an intervening corporation destroys
the immunity of the State, held the corporation liable for a tort.
"~tKinnre v. Chicago (1898) 171 Ill. 332, 49 N. E. 536; Daniels v. Board of
Education (igi6) 191 Mich- 339, 158 N. W. 23, L. R. A. 1916 F, 468; Board of
Education v. Volk (igo5) 72 Ohio St. 469, 74 N. E. 646. See 9 A. L. R. 911, note.
But in New York and occasionally elsewhere, boards of education have been held
liable for their ozwn negligence, as distinguished from that of their servants.
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commissions for public works,l °3 harbor commissioners1 ' have been
deemed not to lie either at all, or at least for torts of its agents and
servants, on the ground that the corporation was a State agency and
performing a governmental function. Less satisfactory is the conclu-
sion reached in several of these cases that though the corporation may
by its charter and the general corporation laws of the state sue and be
sued, this merely permits suit in contract and for special purposes, but
Wahrmann v. Board of Education (19o7) 187 N. Y. 331, 8o N. F_. 192; Jaked v.
Board of Education (x921, 3d Dept.) 198 App. Div. 113, 189 N. Y. Supp. 697;
Herman v. Board of Education (1922) 234 N. Y. 196, 137 N. E. 24; Ferris v.
Board of Education (1899) 122 Mich. 315, 81 N. W. 98 (this was a trespass on
adjoining property, a nuisance created by a city building; in such cases, municipal
liability is not uncommon). The liability is that of the corporation, not of the
individual members of the Board.
So a board of education has been held liable for conversion in appropriating the
property of another for a heating plant in a school. Titusville Iron Co. v.
New York (1912) 207 N. Y. 203, lOO N. E. 8o6; but see contra: McClure Bros.
v. School District 79 (1899) 79 Mo. App. 80.
School districts, like counties and other quasi-public corporations, occupy, as a
state agency, the same status as the state itself. Wiest v. School District 24
(1914) 68 Or. 474, 137 Pac. 749, 49 L. R. A. (x. s.) io26; Juul. v. School District
(1918) 168 Wis. iii, 169 N. W..3o9, and note in 9 A. L. R. 911. But statute may
authorize action for tort Howard v. Tacoma School District (917) 88 Wash.
167, 152 Pac. 1oo4, later repealed by statute adopting general rule. Stovall v.
School District (1920) ilo Wash. 97, 188 Pac. 12, 9 A. L. R. 9o8. In England,
the local education authorities are liable for torts. Smith v. Martin [1911]
2 K. B..775; Ching v. Surrey County Council [191o] 1 K. B. 736, and cases cited
in 9 A. L. R. 912-913, and a similar case in New York, Bassett v. Fish (1878) 75
N. Y. 3o3; see 49 L R. A. (N. s.) 1031, note. In relying upon Mersey Docks
Trustees v. Gibbs, supra note 86, a. case of respondeat superior, the New York
Court of Appeals drew upon an erroneous analogy.
"Ovirholser v. National Home (19o3) 68 Ohio St. 236, 67 N. E. 487; Lyle v.
National Home (19o9, E. D. Tenn.) 17o Fed. 842. (Both arguments inter-
mingled-"charitable corporation created by the state itself for governmental
purposes solely.")
" Commission for building State Capitol. Cope v. Hastings (1897) 183 Pa.
300, 38 Atl. 717. Friend v. Public Works (1900) 7 Ohio Dec. Reprint 56. The
Federal Control Act authorized the Director of Railroads to be named as a defen-
dant in suits against railroads taken under federal control. Missouri Pacific
R. R. Co. v. Ault (1921) 256 U. S. 554, 41 Sup. Ct. 593.
Where the government operates railroads, it is not, in the absence of statute,
liable for torts. Western & Atlantic R. R. v. Carlton (1850) 28 Ga., i8o, 182.
Regina v. McLeod (1883) 8 Can. Sup. Ct. i and cases cited supra note 44. An
intelligent method of dealing with this situation is that adopted in New South
Wales and other Australian states, where the Railway Commissioners are sued,
but'the Crown by statute indemnifies them, as the British Crown does the com-
manders of its warships negligently injuring a private vessel. Saunders v. The
Railway Commissioners (1920) 21 N. S. W. 7.
1 Chapman v. State (1894) 1O4 Calif. 69o, 38 Pac. 457; Denning v. State
(1899) 123 Calif. 316, 55 Pac. iooo. But a river corpolation having supervision
ahd control of the James-River was held subject to suit. Tompkins v. Kanawha
Board (i8i) i9 W. Va. 257.
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does not permit an action arising out of the torts of its officers.'
0 5 This
is not altogether different from the narrow construction given to various
statutes permitting the state to be sued on claims against it, where the
courts assumed that the legislature merely intended to afford the claim-
ant a remedy in the courts, but not to create any new grounds of state
liability, such as for torts.
0 6  Thus, as a state agency it either cannot
be sued at all, or if suable, it escapes liability for the torts of its agents
and servants. It has been suggested that such corporations, in appoint-
ing agents and servants to perform public duties, are themselves merely
superior officers deriving no individual or corporate benefits, but merely
acting as appointing or employing agents for their principal, the State.
Thus, so far as concerns delegable duties, both State and corporation
escape legal responsibility for the torts of subordinates.
°7  It is impor-
tant then to determine who is the agent and who the principal. There
is a tendency, moreover, occasionally to apply the "trust fund" doctrine,
which exempts charitable institutions in some jurisdictions from liabil-
ity for the torts of agents, to state institutions maintained for public,
often charitable, purposes.
10 8
Courts dealing with state corporate agencies of the character just
mentioned are occasionally driven to determine, as in the case of muni-
cipal corporations, whether the particular activity of the corporate agency
was "governmental" or "corporate" in character, and the nature and pur-
pose of the corporation, with a tendency to adopt the mistaken "ultra
vires" doctrine and release the corporation from liability for the torts
of its agents. 0 9 It often becomes necessary to determine whether the
tort-feasor is an agency or sub-division of the State sharing its immuni-
"Minear v. State Board of Agriculture (1913) 259 Ill. 549, 1o2 N. E. 1082;
Morrison v. MacLaren (i915) i6o Wis. 621, 152 N. W. 475; Roper v. Public
Works Commissioners [i915] I K. B. 45. In this last case, while tort actions were
excluded because of the sovereign character of the incorporated Commissioners of
His Majesty's Works and Public Buildings, yet an action in contract was admitted,
without requiring the usual petition of right.
uoSupra, "STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION."
1 See McCaskill, Respondeat Superior (i92o) 5 CORN. L. QUART. 409, 419.
1 Perry v. House of Refuge (1884) 63 Md. 2o; Williamson v. Industrial School
(1894) 95 Ky. 251, 24 S. W. io65; Ford v. Kendall School District (i888) 
121
Pa. 543, 15 At. 812. See McCaskill, Respondeat Superior. (1920) 6 CORN. L.
QUART. 62 et seq.
' Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Burr (1913) 63 Fla. 491, 58 So. 543. This
ultra vires argument, as already observed, is frequently adopted to enable state
officers, about to enforce invalid statutes or otherwise act illegally, to be enjoined,
the act being deemed, by a convenient fiction., their personal act. The ultra spres
argument, *in its most extreme form, insuring complete 'immunity for torts of
agents, reads as follows (quoting from Board of Education v. Volk (i905) .72
Ohio St. 469, 74 N. E. 646): "The board is not authorized to commit a tort, to be
careless or negligent; and, when it commits a wrong or tort, it does not in that
respect represent the district, and, for its negligence or tort in any form, the board
cannot make the district liable."
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ties, or an independent contractor with the State."1 As may be imagined
the decisions are not harmonious, furnishing additional evidence, if that
were needed, that the whole subject, enmeshed in artificialities and
unsound distinctions, requires re-examination in the light of principle
and reason.
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
The peculiar nature of the federal government induced special rules
governing the legal relations arising out of governmental invasion of
private rights. Although the Constitution provides that "private prop-
erty" shall not "be taken for public use without just compensation,"
there was down to 1855, due to the governmental immunity from suit,
no legal means of making the requirement effective. Claimants against
the Government were compelled to adjure Congress to redress their
grievances. The defects of this system, both for the claimant and for
the members of Congress, brought about in 1855 the establishment of
the Court of Claims,"' with jurisdiction, first advisory, later made final,
over specified types of claims. The Act provided:
"The said court shall hear and determine all claims founded 14pon any
law of Congress, or upon any regulations of an executive department,
or upon any contract, express or implied, with the Government of the
United States, which may be suggested to it by petition filed therein;
and also all claims which may be referred to said .court by either house
of Congress."
This act was slightly amended in z887 by adding, inter alia, to the
words "law of Congress" the phrase "upon the Constitution of the
United States," and adding after the clause referring to "any contract,
express or implied." the clause "or for damages, liquidated or unliqui-
dated, in cases not sounding in tort, in respect of which claims the party
would be entitled to redress against the United States either in a court
of law, equity or admiralty if the United States were suable."" 2
"10Murtha v. New York Homeopathic Medical College and Flower Hospital
(192o) 228 N. Y. 183, -28 N. E. 722. (Defendant liable, as mere contractor, for
negligently running over plaintiff.) Limiting Corbett v. St. Vincent's Industrial
School (903) 177 N. Y. i6, 68 N. E. 997. See the learned articles of 0. L.
McCaskill, op. cit. supra notes io7, 1oS.
"eAct of Feb. 24, 1855, c. 122 (io Stat. at L. 612).
"Act of March 3, i887, c. 359 (24 Stat. at L. 5o5). Concurrent jurisdiction
was given to the district and circuit courts in cases under $3,ooo. It is not intended
to examine the history of the Court of Claims and the many special acts of Congress
which have referred cases to the Court of Claims for judgment, advice or findings
of fact. The history of the Court of Claims and some reference to its jurisdiction
in specific cases will be found in the following literature: Judge Richardson, a
member of the Court, History of the Court of Clains (1882) 7 So. L. REv. 78r,
also printed in i7 Ct' Cl. 3, and printed separately; a scholarly article by Ernst
Freund, Private clahns against the state (1893) 8 POL. Sc. QUART. 625; C. C.
Binney, Origh and development of legal recourse against the United States (igog)
57 AFv.P LAw EG. 372 and C. C. Binney, Element of tort as affecting the legal
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Aside from certain special statutes referring to the Court of Claims a
few cases not included in the statute, including a few tort cases, some
of which we shall take occasion to mention, the'Act of 1887, known as
the Tucker Act, embodies the maximum concession which under general
law Congress was willing to make to those sustaining injury at the
hands of the United States. The Supreme Court, howev.er, has so con-
strued the Act as to limit very materially the broad terms of relief which
the Act appears to grant. For example, the Act gave jurisdiction to
the Court of Claims in claims based "upon the Constitution of the United
States." Judge Nott, one of the ablest judges the Court has had, pointed
out in Stovall, Adm. v. United States""' that the purpose of this clause
was to enable owners of property who, like Langford, 114 had been deprived
of their property by the United States government or its officers, whether
claiming the title or not, to recover in the Court of Claims the compensa-
tion to which the Constitution seemed to entitle them. But the Supreme
Court has construed the clause. quite differently; in. fact, the clause seems
to have added nothing to the limited jurisdiction theretofore exercised. 115
It would seem that when a claimant, like Langford or Hill,"' could
show that he was the owner of property and that the United States
Government, through its officers, had taken it from him for a public
use, that he had done all that was necessary to prove his right to receive
compensation under the Fifth Amendment. Not so. He must in addi-
tion prove that the Government has "taken" the property under an
express or implied contract to pay for it. Thus, we find the Supreme
Court asserting117 that "the right to bring suit against the United States
liability of the United States (1911) 2o YALE LAw JouRaia,., 95; Judge Atkinson,
Thq United States Court of Claims (1912) 46 A!sER. LAW Rnv. 227; Ex-Chief
Justice Stanton J. Peelle, Origin and jurisdiction of the United States Court of
Claihs (1922) IO GEORGnrOWN L. Jour. I; Judson A. Crane, Jurisdiction of the
United States Court of Claims (920) 34 HARv. L. REv. 161; Harlan, J., in
United States v. New York (896) 16o U. S. 598, 16 Sup. Ct. 4o2. The statute
is now to be found in the Judicial Code, sec. 145 et seq. (36 Stat. at L. 1135) and 5
Fed. Stat. Anno. (2d ed. 1917) 65o. See also the valuable comments in (1923) 36
HARV. L. lEv. 866 and (1923) 32 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 725.
11 (18gi) 26 Ct. Cl. 226, 239.
."'angford v. United States (1879) 101 U. S. 341.
Practically no case has been able to stand ion "the Constitution of the United
States." It is necessary to prove that the claim, unless a law of Congress refers
it to the Court, arises out of a contract, express or implied. While it seems to have
been thought that the limitation of claims "not sounding in tort" did not apply to
the claims arising under the Constitution, (Dooley v. United States (igoi) 182
U. S. 222, 21 Sup. Ct. 762; Basso v. United States (9o5) 40 Ct. Cl. 202;.
Christie-Street Cominission v. United States (,9o5, C. C. A. 8th) 136 Fed. 326), it
now seems practically certain that it does so apply. Basso v. United States (915)
239 U. S. 602, 36 Sup. Ct. 226.
" 'Hill v. United States (1893) I49 U. S. 593, 13 Sup. Ct. orI.
"' United States v. North American Transportation Co. (1920) 253 U. S. 330,
335, 40 Sup. Ct. 518.
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in the Court of Claims is not founded upon the Fifth Amendment'
1 8
but upon the existence of an implied contract entered into by the-United
States."
Even this would not be so serious were the words "taking" and
"implied contract" given a fairly liberal construction protective of the
private right. But awed by the inhibition against claims "sounding in
tort" and by the traditional view -that the government's consent to be
sued is to be construed as narrowly as possible, the Supreme Court has
given an exceedingly technical construction to the terms "taking" and
"implied contract" and a very wide interpretation to the clause "sound-
ing in tort." Thus the physical act of "taking" must so greatly interfere
with the private use that the injury and deprivation are permanent and
substantial," 9 hence implying a contractual obligation to pay, and not
merely temporary, or consequential, and therefore tortious' 20 There
must be an intent to "take" which need not be expressed, however, but
may be inferred from the circumstances. Thus a denial or questioning
of the owner's right to the ptoperty, by the assertion by the Government
of an adverse or constitutional claim1
2' or the denial of an intent to pay '
22
mS.,chillinger v. United*States (1894) 155 U. S. 163, i5 Sup. Ct. 85; Basso v.
United States (1915) 239 U. S,. 6o2, 36 Sup. Ct. 226.
'A "taking" because of the permanent nature of the injury inflicted by the
Government operation, usually an improvement in some public work, like a
navigable stream, was found in the following leading cases: Pumpelly v. Green
Bay Co. (1871, U. S.) 13 Wall. 166 (land); United States v. Lynch (19o3) IE8
U. S. 445,23 Sup. Ct. 349 (flooding, permanently destroying the utility of the land) ;
United States v. Welch (191o) 217 U. S. 333, 30 Sup. Ct. 527 (easement);
United States v. Cress (1917) 243 U. S. 316, 37 Sup. Ct. 380 (fall necessary to
operate a mill); but see contra: Monongahela Navigation Co. v. Coons (1843,
Pa.) 6 Watts & S. Ioi. Portsmouth Land and Hotel Co. v. United States (192"2)
26o U. S. 327, 43 Sup. Ct. 135 (coast defense guns fired across land frequently,
making it -uninhabitable).
'Jackson v. United States (1913) 230 U. S. I, 33 Sup. Ct. IO1 (intermittent
flooding of land); Cubbins v. M.ssssippi River Connnission (1916) 241 U. S. 357,
36 Sup. Ct. 671 (same); Sanguinetti v.. United States (1924) 264 U. S. 146, 44
Sup. Ct. 264; Scranton v. Wheeler (19oo) 179 U. S. 141, 21 Sup. Ct 48 (interrup-
'tion of riparian access); Peabody v. United States. (1913) 231 U. S. 530, 34
Sup. Ct 159;. Willink v. United States (1916) 24o U. S. 572, 36 Sup. Ct 422
(extension of harbor line across plaintiff's land). -The language used in Transpor-
tation Co. v. Chicago (1878) 99 U. S. 635: "Acts done in the proper exercise of
governmental powers, and not directly encroaching upon private prbperty, though
their consequences may impair its use, are universally held not to be a taking within
the meaning of the constitutional provision," establishes a general standard, rather
than a helpful criterion for the determination of cases.
The provision now so frequently found in state constitutions by which property
taken "or damaged" must be paid for, should also be adopted by the federal
government,kin view of the narrow construction given to the word "taken."
uHill v. United States (1893) 149 U. S. 593, 13 Sup. Ct. ioII; Langf ord v.
'United States (1879) 10 U. S. 341. Had Justice Shiras' dissenting opinion in
Hill v. United States prevailed, namely, that it was only necessary to prove title
and deprivation to invoke the Fifth Amendment, these artificial distinctions would
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will defeat recovery, for the taking is then tortious. The more flagrant
and unjustifiable the Government's act, the less becomes its liability,
hardly a commendable principle of law. Even a district attorney, by
pleading the Government's title, or denying the plaintiff's right or title
or an intent to take or pay, can, it seems, defeat the owner's just claim
to compensation. Moreover, the circumstances must not negative the
owner's consent or at least tacit acquiescence, otherwise the plaintiff will
defeat that consensual relation, which is supposed to underlie the implied
contract-implied in fact rather than law.123  For mere evidence of
enrichment of the Government is sufficient to raise the implication of
payment; a qpasi-contractual obligation will -not be recognized, unless,
as in tort cases, specially covered by a law of Congress conferring juris-
diction.124  Moreover, it is not possible, as it is in so many cases at com-
mon law, to waive the tort, and sue in assumpsit,125 though the English
courts seem more disposed to permit the pursuit of a remedy by petition
of right where the alleged breach of duty arose out of what was origin-
have become unnecessary. They were applied in the patent cases, Schillinger v.
United States (1894) 155 U. S. 163, 15 Sup. Ct. 85; United States v. Palmer
(1888) 128 U. S. 262, 9 Sup. Ct. 104, until ihe Act of June 25, i91o (36 Stit. at
L. 85i) giving the claimant an action in the Court of Claims for patent infringe-
ment by the Government, made them obsolete. (See also dissenting opinion by
Harlan, J.) See also Tempel v. United States (1918) 248 U. S. 121, 39
Sup. Ct. 56.
' Harley v. United States (19o5) 198 U. S. 229, 25 Sup. Ct. 634; Ball Engitieer-
ing Co. v. White (i9i8) 250 U. S. 46, 39 Sup. Ct. 393; Curved Electrotype Plate
Co. v. United States (9,5) 50 Ct. Cl. 258.
The admission of the claimant's right will of course lay the foundation for an
implied contract. United States v. Great Falls Mfg. Co. (1884) 112 U. S. 645, 5
Sup. Ct. 3o5; United States v. Berdan Fireacrin Co. (1894) 156 U. S. 552, 15
Sup. Ct 420.
In England, the trial of title to property claimed or held by the Crown was one
of the earliest functions of the petition of right. Monckton v. Att'y Gen. (385o,
Ch.) 2 Mac. & G. *4o2; Doe d. Legh v. Roe (1841, Exch.) 8 M. & W. 579;
Robertson, op. cit., 332. It is assumed that one of the parties is wrong, and it
makes no difference that one or both make a "claim of right." Either the property
or compensation can be recovered. See Feather v. Regina (1865, K. B.) 6 B. & S.
257, 294, 122 Eng. Rep. 3191, 12o4. Of course, an action of ejectment against the
Government officer lies in the United States, as in United States v. Lee, supra
note ii, provided the Government does not undertake too vigorously to cover him
with its shield.
'Bradford v. United States (I911) 47 Ct. Cl. 141; Jefferson Line Co. v.
United States .(I93) 48 Ct. Cl. 274.
"lDooley v. United States (igoi) 182 U. S. 222, 21 Sup. Ct. 762.
'McArthur v. United States (1894, U. S.) 29 Ct. Cl. r91; Mann v. United
States (1897, U. S.) 32 Ct. Cl 580; Ribas y Hijo v. United States (904) 194
U. S. 315, 24 Sup. Ct. 727. Before the phrase "not sounding in tort" was intro-
duced by the Tucker Act, there was greater willingness to penmit a cause of action
to be framed in contract. See United States v. Russell (3873, U. S.) 13 Wall.
623. On the confusion prevailing in private law in this matter, see Arthur L.
Corbin, Waiver of Tort and Suit in Assumpsit (193o) 39 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 221.
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ally a contractual relation.12  Of course, the taking or contract, whether
express or implied, must be authorized; anyone dealing with a govern-
ment agent is bound by the limits of his actual, not ostensible, authority.
To this requirement, the Supreme Court has given a very strict con-
struction. 12 7  Unless a claimant is fortunate enough to be able to climb
all these hurdles, he is likely to find his claim dismissed as "sounding in
tort.' 128  The reluctance of the Stipreme Court to widen the relief of
the individual injured and compelling him rather than the public at large
to bear the risk of a defective public service, is due to the individualistic
conceptions which lie at the foundation of the American theory of state
immunity from suit and responsibility and to the erroneous belief that
by being held to discharge obligations, the public service is hampered.
As we shall endeavor to point out hereafter, quite the contrary is true.
In recent years a growing legislative tendency has been manifested to
*assume liability for the torts of agents and officers. This is true both of
the states and of the United States. It has already been observed that
the United States has permitted suit to be brought in the Court of Claims
for infringement of patents. 2 ' Special statutes ire often passed, either
appropriating funds, after committee investigation, for torts of various
kinds or referring such claims to the Court of Claims or United States
District Courts for determination and judgment."30  A federal work-
man's compensation Act has been passed.3" In taking over the rail-
'" Windsor & Annapolis R. Co. v. The Queen, (1886, P. C.) ii A. C. 607.
" Cartas v. United 'States (1919) 250 U. S. 545, 40 Sup. Ct. 42; United States
v. North American Transportation & Trading Co. (292o) 253 U. S. 330, 40
Sup. Ct 5i; Sutton v. United States (1921) 256 U. S. 575, 41 Sup. Ct 563. See
the dissenting opinion of -Brandeis, J. in Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v.
United States (1922) 26o U_ S. 327, 43 Sup. Ct. 135, 14o. . United States v.
Bentley & Sons Co. (1923, D. Ohio) 293 Fed. 229.
' See, aside from the property cases above mentioned, Gibbons v. United States
(1868, U. S.) 8 Wall. 269 (loss incurred through delivery of supplies at excessively
low price under duress of officer) ; Morgan v. United States (1871, U. S.) 14 Wall.
531 (negligently ordering master of vessel to cross dangerous reef); German
Bank v. United States (1893) 148 U. S. 573, 13 Sup. Ct. 702 (erroneous cancella-
tion of bonds' by Register of the Treasury) ; Bigby v. United States (19o3) 188
U. S. 400, 23 Sup. Ct 468 (fall of elevator in post office building) ; Jaragua Iron
Co. v. United States (igop) 212 U. S. 302, 29 Sup. Ct. 385 (destruction of property.
for war purposes in war area) ; Basso v. United States (1916) 239 U. S. 6o, 36
Sup. Ct 226 (false imprisonment).
'Act of June 25, 1910 (36 Stat at L. 851). Cramp & Sons v. International
Curtis Marine Co. (1918) 246 U. S. 28, 38 Sup. Qt. 27I. England has permitted
this since 19o7. France, Germany and Austria have long admitted such actions,
infra.
1 See, for example, Act of July 31, 1912 (37 Stat. at L. 1285) referring claim
Delaware Transportation Co. for collision with United States collier. See
fhe Hesperos (igi8, E. D. Va.) 252 Fed. 858 (Act of Apr. 26, I916 [39 Stat. at
L. 1261]). .
'Compensation for disability or death of an employee "resulting from a
personal injury sustained while in the performance of his duty." Act of - Sept. 7,
1916, c. 458 (39 Stat. at L. 742).
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roads and collateral services and in establishing a'Shipping Board for
the operation of merchant ships, the Government placed itself in the
legal position of a private operator . 32  Congress providel in x9I9 for
compensation for damage to property by army aircraft,1 33 and in 1922,
amending earlier acts, made provision for the satisfaction by the heads
of the executive departments or independent establishments of the Gov-
ernment of claims for damage to or loss of private property not in
excess of $I,OOO, "caused by the negligence of any officer or employee
of the Government acting within the scope of his employment." 3 4 If
the principle of tort responsibility of the Government has thus been
recognized as to all branches of the federal public service, Congress
ought easily to be persuaded that the limitation in amount to $i,ooo is
unfair and indeed improper. If it is just and sound that the Govern-
ment should assume responsibility to the public for the torts of its
agents, like other corporations, then the principle should be acknowl-
edged without limitation of liability and judicial relief should be
afforded.
Great confusion was occasioned by the assumption during the war of
government control over the railroad and telegraph systems of the
country. Notwithstanding the provisions of section TO of the Act of
Congress of March 21, 1918 that "carriers while under federal'control
shall be subject to all laws and liabilities as common carriers ....
and that in actions at law or suits in equity against the carrier. ....
no defense shall be made . . . . that the carrier is an instrumentality
or agency of the federal government," it seemed to many courts very
doubtful whether, a company could constitutionally be rendered liable
for an act done by the federal government and its employees. To
overcome this doubt the Director General of Railroads issued a Gen-
eral Order to the effect that he should be named as defendant, but this
only added to the confusion, for several courts promptly held it con-
trary to the statute and invalid, whereas others held it valid,1 5 though
reAct of March 21, -1918 (40 Stat. at L. 456) (railroads) ; Act of Sept. 7, i916
(39 Stat. at L. 728) sec. 9; Act of March 9, i92o (41 Stat. at L. 5:,5). See infra.
"Act of July ii, i919, c. 8 (41 Stat. at L. xog). Many other cases of various
types, mostly iequisition cases, were referred to the United States District Courts
and the Court of Claims during the war. See the list of these in Uited States v.
Pfitsch (1921) 256 U. S. 547, 553, note, 41 Sup. Ct. 569, 571.
" Act of December 28, 1922, c. 17 (42 Stat. at L. iO66) ; an Act of- the same
'day, c. 16, gave the Secretary of the Navy power to settle collision claims up to
$3,ooo (42 Stat. at L. io66).
'Held invalid in Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, North and South- Dakota,
and Wisconsin. Held valid in the Circuit Court of Appeals, eighth circuit, a few
federal district courts and in Virginia, Michigan, and South Carolina, and finally
by the United States Supreme Court in Missouri Pac. R. R. Co. v Ault (1921)
256 U. S. 554, 41 Sup. Ct. 593, holding that the term "carriers" in the Act author-
izing suits "against carriers" meant the systems and not the corporations and that
Congress intended to grant a limited consent to suit against the government, the
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there was no certain means of paying any judgment and the Act of
March 2t, 1918 had forbidden any levying of process against the prop-
erty of the railroads. The confusion, largely arising out of the nar-
row construction given to an assumed governmental consent to suit,
gave rise to a great amount of litigation, most of which might have
been avoided had Congress and the Courts not labored under a tradi-
tional preconception against governmental liability to suit.
In the telegraph cases Congress had failed to provide even for the
constitutionally doubtful method of a suit against the company or system
or against the Government, and as the companies were not deemed oper-
ating agents of tlie Government, it would seem that rio one could be sued
for torts committed by employees in the operation of the telegraph
system, except possibly some more or less irresponsible subordinate
employee personally negligent. 1386 Even the existence of an indemnity
contract between the Government and the company by which the Gov-
ernment. agreed to hold the company harmless for judgments found
against it during governmental control, did not, said the Supreme
Court, authorize a suit against the company; and the absence of any
special statute, of course, left the rule of governmental immunity
from suit in full force. The fact that Judge Learned Hand per-
mitted a suit to lie against the Government under the Tucker Act for
breach of an implied contract to transmit a cable message during fed-
eral control of a cable company 37 opens the door but slightly and indi-
cates to how great an extenit irresponsibility was substituted for respon-
sibility by the assumption of federal control of the telegraph systems.
The question of governmental immunity from suit when engaged in
the operation of a public service has been frequently litigated in admir-
alty in the case of injuries inflicted upon private vessels by ships
owned or operated by the Government. Such government control and
operation of merchant shipping has survived the war in many countries,
and in the United States and England has led to an exhaustive examina-
tion of'the whole subject. The results are not harmonious or satis-
factory. In the United States, the act creating the Shipping Board'3 8
Director General of Railroads being the proper person, therefore, to appear as
defendant. This complicated question of statutory construction, which is of
collateral interest only, is discussed with citation of the many conflicting decisions
in Valvoline Oil Co. v. Davis (1922, C. C. A. 2d) 282 Fed. 216 and in (192o) 5
CORN. L. QUART. 203-209; (1919) 88 CENT. L. Joum. 352 and 89 ibid. 157; (1921)
27 CASE & COMMENT 35, 4- 58, 4 A. L. R. 16go, 8 A. L. R. 969 and io A. L. R. 956.
'"'Western Union Telegraph Cb. v. Poston (1921) 256 U. S. 662, 41 Sup. Ct.
598, and also decisions of state courts cited in the note of Brandeis, J., in that
opinion and in (919) 33 HARv. L. REV. 322.
"'Heil v. United States (1921, S: D. N. Y.) 273 Fed. 729.
" Act of Sept. 7, 1916 (39 Stat at L. 728, sec. 9). By Act of June 17, 1910
(36 Stat. at L. 537) and Act of June 24, 191o (36 Stat at L. 6o7) authority is
-given to the Secretary of Commerce to adjust claims for collision for which
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provided that merchant ships operated by the United States Shipping
Board, including vessels purchased, chartered or leased from them,
"shall be subject to all laws, regulations and liabilities governing mer-
chant vessels, whether the United Stat~s be interested therein as owner,
in whole or in part, or hold any mortgage, lien or other interest therein."
After such a vessel had been arrested, however,13" -and the threat to
the continuity of voyages and operations of government by arrest of
vessels became apparent, a new statute was passed substituting for the
former seizure and arrest of vessels and cargoes140 an action in per-
sonam against the United States in admiralty causes arising out 'of
acts of government-owned merchant vessels. This proper statutory
submission to suit, without permitting an actual interference with the
operations of government, is a concession to the exigencies of modern
life and an indication that' the justice f gdvernmental operation with,
rather than without, responsibility, is gradually being recognized.
Yet even before this limited statutory recognition of amenability to
suit for injuries committed by certain. government vessels, the courts
had had frequent occasion to deal with the subject. They were moved
by conflicting theories. The animistic admiralty theory which per-
sonifies the ship as the wrongdoer and permits a libel in rem "against
the ship" regardless of ownership competed with the common law
theory that public property enjoys the same immunity from suit as the
sovireign owner himself, 1 1 and that a suit in rem "against the property"
will not lie when there was no action against the owner in personam.
It is not surprising that the effort to reconcile such divergent theories,
both grounded in long usage, should have resulted in compromises, dis-
tinctions and inferences which, to say the least, make little convincing
appeal to reason. The question has been complicated by the fact that
courts often have had to deal with the status df ships owned by foreign
sovereigns, and have permitted themselves, erroneously, to be influenced
vessels of the Lighthouse Service shall be found responsible, and to the Secretary
of the Navy, in the case of vessels of the Navy, not exceeding in either case $5oo in
amount. The Barendrecht (1922, S. D. N. Y.) 286 Fed. 386, 39o. The latter Act
was amended on Dec. 28, i922 (42 Stat. at L. io66) to cover claims not exceeding
$3,ooo, accrued since Apr. 6, 1917 and the former was replaced by a new Act on the
same day (42 Stat. at L. xo66) extending the power to all heads of departments to
settle claims against their departments, not exceeding $i,ooo, arising out of injury
to private .property due to the negligence of officers or employees within the scope
of their authority.
" The "Lake Monroe" (1919) 250 U. S. 246, 39 Sup. Ct. 460.
"Act of March 9, 1920.(41 Stat. at L. 525). But for a libel in personam
against the United States, the vessel must be in a port of the United States or its
possessions. Blamberg Bros. v. United States (1923) 26o U. S. 452, 43 Sup. Ct.
i79; 23 CoL. L. REV. 594. In The Snug Harbor (1922, E. D. Va.) 283 Fed. 1015,
the United States was held liable in tort for failure to mark the wreck of its
sunken vessels, causing injury.
14 See Field, J., in The Siren (1868, U. S.) 7 Wall. 152.
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by the rule of international law exempting foreign public vessels from
the local jurisdiction.
14 2
If the public vessel is a warship, it is clear that she cannot be
libelled, 143 and no action against the United States for her torts would
lie. Here the common law rule of sovereign immunity prevails over
the admiralty rule of the ship's responsibility for torts, regardless of
knowledge or innocence of owners.144  In England, better justice is
attained by having the suit directed against the wrongdoing master,
and then having the Lords of the Admiralty, by the Crown counsel
and Treasury Solicitor, voluntarily put in an appearance, the Govern-
ment paying the judgment found against the master.14 5 While Con-
gress has on numerous occasions passed special Acts providing for
the payment of damages for injuries committed by United States war
vessels or referring the claim to the Court of Claims, 46 a bill provid-
ing for suits in admiralty for collisions caused by and salvage services
rendered to public vessels of the United States has, though introduced
in several successive Congresses and favorably reported, failed to
become a law.147 The fact that salvage suits against public vessels
have sometimes been sustained as suits arising, when rendered volun-
tarily, not out of contract, but yet constituting a claim for unliquidated
damages not sounding in tort under the Tucker Act, 48 hardly dimin-
The dictum of Haight, J., in The Johnson Lighterage Co., No. 24 (ii6,
D. N. J.) 231 Fed. 365, would indicate that the court believed the immunity from
suit of the domestic and the foreign sovereign to rest upon the same basis.
The Athol (1842, Adm.) I W. Rob. 374.
'"The China (1868, U. S.) 7 Wall. 53.
21 "H. M. S. Sans Pareil" [19ool P. 267; The Athol (1842, Adm.) I W. Rob.
374. Robertson, The Law and Practice of Civil Proceedings by and against the
Crown (19o8) 525.
" See e. g. Act of June 25, 29IO, ch. 474 (36 Stat. at L. 187o-1874) "to satisfy
certain claims against the Government arising under the Navy Dept." Similar
acts are passed at almost every session of Congress. Some of them are referred
to by George D. Lord in his article Admiralty Claims agafitst the Government, 19
CoL L. Ray. 467, 472.
"' See H. R. 64, Sen. 1662, 63d Cong. 1st sess.;, H. R. 6256, 67th Cong. Ist sess.,
Report of Committee on Admiralty and Maritime Law, 1922, A. B. A. REP. 89;
(1923) ibid. 127; (r924) ibid. 28. The recommendation of the Maritime Associa-
tion of the United States is to strike the words "merchant vessel" out of the Act
of March 9, 292o, so as to make the Government liable for the torts of public
ships generally. See Resolutions of Brussels Conference (1923) A. B. A. JoUR.
603; Matsunami, rImunity of State Ships (1924) 39 et seq., 62 et seq.
11 United States v. Cornell Steamboat Co. (I9O6) 202 U. S. 184, 26 Sup. Ct.
648; United States v. Morgan (igoo, C. C. A. 4th) 99 Fed. 570, aff'd I8o U. S.
638, 21 Sup. Ct- 920. The Davis (1869, U. S.) io Wall. 15. The Olockson (1922,
C. C. A. 5th) 281 Fed. 690; (922) 32 YALE LAW jouzNAL 283. But in England,
it has recently been held that no action in ren-dictum added "or otherwise"-
lies against the Crown for salvage. Young v. S. S. Scotia. (P. C.) [29o3] A. C.
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ishes the propriety and justice of the demand for statutory submis-
sion to suit in the case of all injuries committed by -public vessels.149
When we come to merchant, ships greater confusion prevails. The
English courts proceed on the theory that no suit lieb in rein, unless
the owner could at common law have been impleaded in personam.
Under the English theory, moreover, a suit "against the ship" is in the
nature merely of a foreign attachment, for the purpose of jurisdiction
and security. Thus, jurisdiction is denied in admiralty over public
vessels whether engaged in commerce or not.150 The American courts,
more firmly attached to the original admiralty theory which personifies
the ship regardless of its owner, have been more disposed to disregard
the sovereign character of the defendant owner and seek some ground
upon which they could sustain an exception to the rule of govern-
mental immunity. The result has been to leave the laws in a most unsat-
isfactory state, as has been disclosed by the conflicting decisions ren-
dered during the war, notably in respect of the ships of foreign sover-
eigns. In numerous cases, the immunity was allowed, on the demand
of the owning government, though the courts seem uncertain whether
the immunity rests upon sovereignty or upon the-public nature of the
service in which the ship is engaged.' 5' In other cases, the exemp-
"tion from the jurisdiction was not allowed, either on no well-considered
grounds' 2 or on distinctions resting on assumed lack of possession on
the part of government officers' 53 or on the commercial or assumed non-
public nature of the service in which the ship was engaged, rather than
5oi (a Canadian Government ferry boat). 17 HARV. L. RFv. 27o. But the Crown
usually enters an appearance and 6ffers to pay such salvage as the court directs.
The M1arquis of Huntley (835, Adr.) 3 Hagg. Adm. 246.
' In continental Europe, such action almost always lies in the administrative
courts. See infra.
'The Parlement Beige (i8&t C. A.) 5 Prob. 197; The Jassy [19o6] Prob.
.270; The Broadmayne [1916] Prob. 64 (requisitioned ship operated in govern-
ment service by private owner); The Gagara i991] Prob. 95.
'uBriggs v. Light-Boats (1865, Mass.) ii Allen 157 (not in admiralty; deemed
to rest on sovereignty); The Panpa (1917, E. D. N. Y.) 245 Fed. 137 (an
Argentine naval transport employed in carrying a private cargo) ;' The Maipo
(i98, S. D. N. Y.) 252 Fed. 627, 259 Fed. 367 (a Chilean naval transport char-
tered to a private individual for commercial purposes, though manned by her
naval crew). The Roseric (igi9, D. N. J.) 254 Fed. i54 (British merchant ship
in charge-of privately paid crew, but under requisition by the British Government
as admiralty transport). See also W. W. Bisschop, Immunity of States in
Maritime Law, i92, BRtTisH Y. B. INT. L. 159; also McNair, in 192I, ibid. 68.
' The Attualita (1916, C. C. A. 4th) 238 Fed. 9o9 (Merchant ship requisitioned
by the Italian government, but operated by its owners).
'" This is especially true in the case of liens for salvage, when the ship or cargo
is not in the possession of the government or its officers. The Davis (1869, U. S.)
io Wall. 15; Long v. The Tampico (1883, S. D. N. Y.) 16 Fed. 491, 5Ol; The
Johnson Lighterage Co., No. 24 (1916, D. N. J.) 23! Fed. 365.
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on the mere question of ownership.',54 The soundness of the theory
that suit will lie when Government possession is not disturbed, is very
questionable ;155 it may have been invented to justify on some plausible
ground the enforcement of a lien, usually for salvage, against Gov-
ernment property. When Judge Mack, in his scholarly opinion in The
Pesaro'516 declined to exempt a merchant vessel owned by the Italian
government from the local jurisdiction, especially as she was not
immune in the Italian courts, he broke with the English rule of the
Parlement BelgeI57 and laid down a rule which modern life demands,
for it is not conceivable that thousands of government ships should
roam the seas on ordinary commercial errands and yet escape all respon-
sibility to the law. But whether these Goyernment ships should actu-
ally be subject to arrest by the process of foreign courts is a more
debatable question; the Act of Congress of March 9, 1920158 prevents
arrest of vessels of the Shipping Board, leaving liability in persoiiam,
and has sought to effect a similar freedom from arrest in. foreign ports.
It will hardly be disputed that Government enterprise should not be phys-
ically interrupted by judicial process, but this implies the substitution
of a voluntary admission of liability for transactions at least of a "non-
governmental" character, conceding for the moment the difficulty. of
drawing an exact line. of demarcation between public or governmental
and non-governmental functions.159 But as the rule laid down in The
Pesaro can hardly prevail over the protest of foreign governments,' it
would be well in the international field to agree diplomatically upon a
voluntary submission to the courts, either the foreign or home courts,
in the case of vessels engaged..in commerce, as is provided in the case
of United States government merchantmen, in the Act of March 9, 1920.
Not the least interesting of the anomalies arising from the attempt
to reconcile th6 admiralty law with the common law in -respect to the
-liability incurred by the torts of'those in charge of public vessels, arose
in the case of Workman v. Mayor of New York,160 in which suit was
"' The Pesaro (19mI, S. D. N. Y.) 277 Fed. 473. See also on this case (i922)
35 HARV. L..REv. 330; (1922) 70 U. PA. L. REV. 322. 'See also The Fidelity
(1879, S. D. N. Y.) 6 Blatchf. 56g, Fed. Cas. No, 4758 (by Waite, C. J.).
'Briggs v. Light-Boats (1865, Mass.) ii Allen 157; Young v. S. S. Scotia
(P.C.) [io3] A. C. 5o1; Vavasseur v. Krupp (1877, Ch.) 9 Ch. 351. In these
cases, among others, possession was held to be immaterial. See Weston,'Actions
against the Property of Sovereigns (1gig) 32 HARv. L REv. 266, 269. Conrad,
Immiunity of Public Vessels in "Lectures on Legal Topics," (1924) N. Y. ST.
B. A. REP. 478.
(1921, S. D. N. Y.) 277 Fed. 473.
(i88o, C. A.) 5 Prob. 197.
"'Supra, note 140. 1 See infra.
"' (i90o) 179 U. S. 552, 21 Sup. Ct. 212. Four justices dissented. See also
Chicago v. White 7ransportation Co. (1917, C. C. A. 7th) 243 Fed. 358; Rodgers
& Hagerty v. City of New York (192, C. C. A. 2d) 285 Fed. 362, (1918) 2
Mixxl. L. REv. 3o7, and note on liability of municipal corporations in admiralty in
L. R. A.. 1918 A, lO7g.
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brought against the city of New York because of a tollision caused by
the negligent management of a municipal fire-boat in extinguishing a
fire along the water-front. The suit was brought in persoam."6 ' It
was admitted that a municipal fire-engine equally negligently operated
would, being used for governmental purposes, leave the city immune
from liability, and that this was the local law in New York.
16 2 Yet
Justice White, exalting the supremacy and symmetry of the maritime
law which personifies the wrongdoing ship, though conceding to the
common law the immunity from suit- of the state, but not of the city,
held the city liable for the injury done. His words warrant quotation,
and might well be applied to the entire doctrine of immunity from
jurisdiction and from the application of the ordinary rules of law which
surrounds the activities of the state.
"The disappearance of all symmetry in the maritime law .... which
would thus arise [by conceding immunity] would, however, not be the
only evil springing from the application of the principle relied on, sintce
the maritime law which would survive would have imbedded in it a
denial of justice. This must be the inevitable consequence of admitting
the proposition which assumes that the maritime law disregards the
rights of individuals to be protected in their persons and property from
wrongful injury, by recognizing that those who are amenable to the
jurisdiction of courts of admiralty are nevertheless endowed with a
supposed governmental attribute by which they can inflict injury upon
the person or property of another, and yet escape all responsibility
therefor."
Yet where the vessel negligently operated was owned by the State
of New York under the jurisdiction of the Superintendent of Public
Works, the Supreme Court in I92I, in a suit brought in admiralty, had
no difficulty in permitting Justice White's "denial of justice" to become
imbedded in the maritime law, admitting the supremacy of the common
law immunity from suit over the rule of liability in admiralty. 63 Thus
we find that there is a vital difference between-the liability of a municipal
corporation in its governmental activity of extinguishing a fire from the
land side and from the water side, and again a vital difference in result,
- There is a conflict of authority as to whether a public vessel of a city may be
arrested. Cf. The Fidelity, supra note 154, and The Oyster Police Steamers of
Maryland (x887, D. Md.) 31 Fed. 763. As to vessels of a state, which are exempt'
from arrest, see In re State of New York, The Queen City (1921, U. S.) 256
U. S. 503, 41 Sup. Ct. 592. In Thompson Navigation Co. v. Chicago (1897, N. D.
Ill.) 79 Fed. 984, Grosscup, J., permitted suit against the city it personaon, but not
in rem
"' Farley v. New York (1897) 152 N. Y. 222, 227, 46 N. E. 5o6.
Zit; re State of New York, Petition of Walsh (1921) 256 U. S. 490:41 Sup. Ct.
588. A similar conclusion was reached as to the liability of a Delaware county,
an unincorporated governfental subdivision of the State, in a suit in admiralty
arising out of the negligent operation of a drawbridge. The Alex Y. Hanna
(1917, D. Del.) 246 Fed. 157. See contra, as to a Massachusetts county, which
by statute was corporate and suable. O'Keefe v. Staples Coal Co. (I9IO, D. Mass.)
2oi Fed. 131.
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depending on the ownership of the boat by the larger group known as
the State or the smaller group known as the city. Distinctions of so
artificial a character constitute, it is believed, a symptom of the senility
of the doctrines on which they are founded.
But the apotheosis of the doctrine in admiralty was reached in 1922.
In the case of United States v. Thompson'6 it was held by the Supreme
Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Holmes, that a Government vessel
could not commit an injury giving rise to a maritime lien, hence at no
time, though .the vessel subsequently reached private hands, could such
a lien be enforced."65 This conclusion 'vas derived from the fact that
inasmuch as the so-called lien could never have been enforced against
the Government, therefore the original collision could not have been a
"tort" or an act giving rise to a legal obligation. "Legal obligations
that exist but cannot be enforced are ghosts that are seen in the law,
but that are elusive to the grasp." Thus, the immediacy of the privilege
of enforcement seems to be Justice Holmes' test of the existence of a
claim against the Government. Nor can the Government, he says, be
guilty of a fault or "tort" since it itself makes the law and is therefore not
bound by it, a proposition to which Justice McKenna expressed vigorous
dissent. The validity of this theory of Justice Holmes, which he founds
upon the authority of Bodin, Hobbes and Austin, we shall have further
occasion to examine. 166  But at this point it may be said that his decision
leads to the conclusion that the court in previous cases erred in recogniz-
ing the validity of liens against public vessels.117  Moreover, if there
never was a "tort" ab initio, it would seem wrong to permit, as has often
been done, set-off and recoupment against the Government for damages
9= (I 22) 257 U. S. 419, 42 Sup. Ct. 159.
The English Court of Appeal, reversing the courf below in The Tervaete
[x9" 2, C. A.] Prob. 197; ibid. 259, has reached the same conclusion as to the
survivorship of liens, after, the vessel is transferred from public to private owner-
ship, but on grounds a little more satisfactory than those advanced by Justice
Holmes. The British court takes the view that a lien, surviving, would diminish
the value of Government property in case of sale, but in England at least, as
already observed, the commander can be sued for collisions and the Government
pays the judgment. See also The Sylvan Arrow [1923, C. A.] Prob. 220, where
the lien under similar circumstances was denied because defendants were com-
pelled to surrender their ship to the United States Government, during whose
operation the collision occurred. Justice Holmes takes the ground that the
Government, being immune from suit, is incapable of committing an injury giving
rise to legal relations, for it is above the law. Chief Justice Waite in The
Fidelity, supra note 154, also took the position that it was not want of power to
sue, but want of liability, which exempted public vessels.
See infra.
1 The St. Jago de Cuba (1824, U. S.) 9 Wheat. 409 (lien for seaman's wages);
United States v. Wilder (1838, C. C. D. Mass.) 3 .Sumner 3o8 (lien for general
average); The Davis (1869, U. S.) Io Wall. 15; United States v. Morgan (1goo,
C. C. A. 4th) 99 Fed. 570, 572 (lien for salvage).. In these cases, the Govern-
ment's possession was not disturbed.
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by collision and otherwise, where the Government commences the suit ;16s
whereas the removal of the procedural difficulty of suing the state or
impleading its property had previously been regarded as evidence of a
desire where possible to do justice to the indvidual.'6 9  Indeed, if Justice
Holmes' theory is correct, even voluntary submission to suit would not
enable the court to impose damages on the Government, for there never'
was a liability and none could, it would seem, be created, by merely
waiving the immunity from suit. The fact is, We venture to believe,
that the theory is unsound, being dominated by a slavish worship of an
antiquated conception of absolutism and finding in the absence Qf a
"tort"-a term of private and not of public law-an absence of injury
or operative fact of which the courts may properly take account when
they can obtain jurisdiction.
QUASI-CORPORATIONS
The administrative organization in the United States has developed
the county as the largest political subdivision of the State for the per-
formance of what are called "governmental" functions. The county is
created by the legislature for purposes of local government, with an elec-
tive or appointive official personnel, for the administration of local
matters. It is a highly developed form of local self-government in the
United States. Included within these so-called quasi-corporations-for
they were not at first incorporated at all-are counties, towns, school
districts, road districts and the like. In view of the fact that the
people themselves have so direct a share in the management of these
bodies, it is perhaps the more surprising that they were endowed by the
courts with the shield of kingly sovereignty, and, with minor exception,
were and are, in the absence of specific statute, not responsible foi the
torts.of their agents. For us, interest lies in determining the grounds
of this immunity.
In the United States, that immunity appears first to have been worked
out in New England,'1 7 where a court of Massachusetts relied upon the
11 The Siren (1868, U. S.) 7 Wall. 152. See also The Gloria (iig, S. D. N. Y.)
267 Fed. 929; The City of Philadelphia (192o, E. D. Pa.) 263 Fed. 234; The
F. J. Luckenback (i92o, S. D. N. Y.) 267 Fed. 931. The Olockson (I922, C. C. A.
5th) 281 Fed. 69o. Justice Holmes made an attempt, unconvincing to the writer,
to distinguish The Siren, supra, in United States v. Thompson, supra. See on the
last case, the following comments, only one of which approves the decision of the
court: (1922) 31 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 879; (1922) 2o MIcH. L. REv. 533; (922)
io CALI. L. REV. 333; (1922) 17 ILL. L. REv. 57 (approves).
" (1911) 33 L. R. A. (N. s.) 376. Right of set-off, counter-claim, or recoup-
ment in action by State, note to State of Arkansas v. Arkansas Brick & Manu-
facturing Co. (1911, Ark.) 135 S. W. 843. There is a great divergence among
the state courts on this subject. It is not within our immediate purpose to
examine this subject. See 25 R. C. L. 411.
"'Mower v. Leicester (182) 9 Mass. 247, 250. See also the modern English
rule in Gibson v. The Mayor (i87o) L. R. 5 'Q. B. 218, 222. On the other hand,
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English case of Russell v. Men 6f Devon. 17' In that case, an unincor-
porated county was held immune from responsibility for an injury aris-
ing out of a defective bridge, because it had no corporate fuAd or the
means of obtaining one, and it seemed impracticable to permit judgment
to-be satisfied out of the assets of possibly a few individuals. Hence
the injured individual, for practical reasons, was denied relief. Yet the
only similarity between the situation in New England and the Russell
case lay in the fact that the defendants were counties. The New England
county was incorporated, had a corporate fund and the means of enlarg-
ing it by taxation and was charged bystatute with the duty of keeping
highways in repair. Under the authority of Russell v. Devon, there-
fore, practically no reason for immunity can be found in these circum-
stances to exist, yet the Massachusetts court passed judgment for the
defendant on the unconvincing ground that the county was a quasi-
corporation created by the legislature for purposes of. public policy and
not voluntarily, like a city, and that as a State agency it was therefore
immune. This poorly reasoned decision, based upon a case which con-
tradicts rather than sustains it, has been followed very. generally in
New England and has become the "common law" of the states of the
United States, with few exceptions.17 2 That a quite different rule pre-
vails with respect to municipal corporations proper, in the case of high-
ways and bridges, and that the distinctions are curiously sustained, will
be presently noted.
As the old reasons for county immunity, mentioned in the Russell
case, disappeared in fact, new reasois had to be devised. The usual
ground was public policy, but on the nature of that policy the courts
cannot agree. Only a few courts have gone so far as to suggest that
the county is, like the state of which it is a political subdivision, immune
from suit without consent.' 73  The great majority of the courts,, how-
ever, have put the immunity from substantive responsibility on the
ground that the county was created for public purposes, charged with
the performance of duties as an arm or branch of the state government,
and cannot therefore be liable for failure or negligence in the perform-
in Maryland, the distinction between the county in Russell v. Devon and the Mary-
land county, which was a corporation and had a corporate fund, was readily per-
ceivel, and'liability imposed. Anne Arundel County v. Duckett (864) 20 Md. 468.
17 (1789, K. B.) ioo Eng. Rep. 359. The immunity is more correctly explained
historically in that no action on the case lay by a private individual against a town
or county for the omission of a public duty; the correct procedure was by
indictment Bro. Abr., "Accibn sur la case," pl. 93.
" 4 Dillon, Municipal Corporations (5th ed. 1911) sec. 1688 and cases cited in'
13 R. C. L. 306-307, notes 2 and 3, and 2 A. L. R. 721, note. The exception is
practically onfined to Iowa, Maryland anl Pennsylvania,. i. e. in the absence of a
specific statutory liability.
I Heigel v. Wichita County (1892) 84 Tex. 392, 19 S. W. 562 (dictum, referring
to "other courts"). McDermott v. Delaware County (19T5) 6o Ind. App. 209, 11o
N. E. 237.
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ance of its public-sometimes even called corporate-duties. The
alleged distinction in this respect between counties and municipal cor-
porations proper is said to lie in the further fact that counties and
so-called quasi-corporations" generally are involuntary political divisions
of the state organized without regard to the consent of the inhabitants,
whereas municipal corporations proper, it is said, are voluntary asso-
ciations organized under a franchise or charter from the State at the
request and for the benefit and local advantage and convenience of the
inhabitants.
The language of the Supreme Court of Texas in the case of Heigel v.
Wichita County7 4 is typical of that used by many other courts to
explain the distinction:
"Counties," said the Court, "are not corporations in the fullest
sense of that term. They are commonly called, 'quasi-corporations.'
They are created by the state for the purposes of government. Their
functions are political and administrative, and the powers conferred,
upon them are rather duties imposed than privileges granted. Cities,
on the other hand, are deemed voluntary corporations, and, while they
exercise political functions, it is considered that their 'charters are
granted not so much with a view to the interests of the public as for the
private advantage of their citizens. It is upon this distinction that the
courts ordinarily base the difference in the rule of liability as applied to
municipal corporations proper, and to quasi-municipal corporations, such
as counties and townships. Other courts hold that, since a county is.
but a political subdivision of the sthte, a suit against tle county is, in
effect, a suit against the state,- and that, therefore, an action will. not lie
without the-consent of the legislature. But upon whatever ground it
should be placed, it is fairly well settled that in cases like this [injury
sustained by reason of a defective bridge] cities are liable and couiities
are not."' 75
The precedents making this alleged distinction are so numerous that
it is probably heresy to suggest that the formal differences to which the.
courts direct attention are without substantial merit or justification for
a difference in doctrine. Both county and city are created by the
people, often the same people, appropriately represented, for the pur-
pose of better administering their public business' 7
6 and the distinctions
made, as we shall have further occasion to observe hereafter, are for
the most part artificial and have been repudiated, though not always
with the same result, by a number of courts.
1t Supra, note 173.
"'See also for similar expresgions of the distinction, Maddcen v. Lancaster County
(1894, C. C. A. 8th) 65 Fed. 188; El Pso County v. Bish (1893) x8 Colo. 474, 33
Pac. 184; Millwood v. De" Kalb County (1899) io6 Ga. 743,32 S. E. 577, and cases
cited in 2 A. L. R. 722.
2" See the New York statute of 1892, Cons. Laws, igo9, ch. ii, art. 2, sec 3,
declaring counties municipal corporations: !'A county is a municipal corporation,
comprising the inhabitants within its boundaries, arid formed for the purpose of
exercising the powers and discharging the duties of local government, and the
administration of public affairs conferred upon it by law.'
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Statutes have frequently created the county a corporation or munici-
pal corporation with power to sue or be sued, or have charged the county
or county commissioners with the duty of taking care of or repairing
highways, bridges, public buildings and other specific public property.
On the alleged ground that these statutes are in derogation of the
common law, the courts have for the most part given them a very nar-
row construction. For example, a statute creating the county a cor-
poration with power to be sued was regarded as extending only to con-
tracts and not to the torts of its agents. 77 In other courts, the statute
has not been regarded as diminishing the common-law immunity of
counties,'7 8 though the existence of the statute often induces an inves-
tigation into the distinction between governmental and corporate func-
tions which is the distinctive feature of municipal responsibility in
tort. So, though the statute imposes the duty of maintaining high-
ways, bridges or buildings in good repair, this has been held not to
impose any liability to an injured individual for failure properly to per-
form the statutory duty.'79 For this purpose, many courts require very
specific language."" And the statutes will not be extended beyond
the exact subject-matter embraced in them or beyond their plain
terms.'"' Some. of the states which, by judicial construction, allow a
county liability for defective bridges, refuse to extend the same rule
to roads and highways or to county buildings, as in Iowa. Indeed, in
Iowa, the size of the bridge is an important operative fact, for small
bridges are not covered by that court's exceptional rule imposing lia-
bility on counties for negligently defective bridges. s2 Attention may
be called to the quite unusual statute of Connecticut which imposed
liability upon the county for damage to the creditor-.by debtor prisoners
escaping from defective jails.113 Injuries to private property inflicted
in the construction of public works, if done in states where "damage"
to private property is deemed the subject of eminent domain, may
impose liability upon the county, but by the weight of authority it seems
" Wood v. Tipton County (874, Tenn.) 7 Bax. 112.
'Hughes v. County of Monroe* (1895) 147 N. Y. 49, 41 N. E. 407; Markey v.
Queens County (1898) 154 N. Y. 675 and the exhaustive note in 39 L. R. A. 33.
' Barnett v. Contra Costa County (1885) 67 Calif. 77, 7 Pac. 177; Snuethen v.
Harrison County (x915) 172 Iowa, 81, 152 N. W. 12. Sinkhorn v. Lexington
Turnpike (19ol) 112 Ky. 2o5, 65 S. W. 356.
But other courts have held that the duty to maintain implies responsibility for
neglect or failure. Millwood v. De Kalb County, supra note 175; Cones v. Benton
County (1893) 137 Ind. 404, 37 N. E. 272; Richardson v. Kent County (1913) 120
Md. 153, 87 Ati. 747, and cases in 2 A. L. R. 724.
... See statutes of Michigan, Nebraska, Ohio, West Virginia, South Carolina,
cited with judicial authority in 2 A. L. R. 724 and statutes in Alabama, Georgia,
Kansas, Massachusetts and New Jersey discussed in 39 L. R_ A. 43.
"tFranklin County v. Darst (1917) 96 Ohio St. 163, 117 N. E. 166.
Taylor v. Davis County (1875) 40 Iowa, 295; Chandler v. Freenont County
(1875) 42 Iowa, 58.
Gen. Stat. 1918, sec. 1992. Dutton v. Litchfield County (1792) I Root, 450.
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difficult to construe most injuries, for which there is a general immunity,
as a "damage" under eminent domain.'84 In New Jersey and Louisi-
ana there is county liability for negligence in operating alrawbridges ;185
in many states, a county is held liable for infringement of patents ;18
but unless a county has received the benefit of a money payment, it is
not liable for the defalcations of a county treasurer or other officer of
the county. This is the usual rule as to officers receiving moneys from
the public, for deposit or otherwise, and in so far as they are trustees
for the owner, it seems unjust for the county or other public corporation
to repudiate liability for an officer whom it holds out to the public as
responsible and to throw the risk of his integrity upon the particular
member of the public dealing withi him.
Enough has been said to show that the rules relating to the liability of
counties and other quasi-corporations-some of which, like school dis-
tricts, we have already adverted to-for the torts of their officers and
agents have remained stagnant in the face of great social and even
legal changes, and are supported on reasons which, to say the least, can-
not command respect. The subject requires fundamental re-examina-
tion. In view of the close legal approximation between the incorporated
county and the municipal corporation, it is believed that no valid ground
for a distinction between the two, so far as concerns liability in tort,
any longer exists. Indeed, it is believed that with the deflation of the
conception of sovereignty and the realization that all political group
organizations, from the smallest to the largest, are merely means adopted
by the people to enable them to perform certain public services, that
there is no sound reason either for differentiating their responsibility
according to size or form of organization or to grant them immunity
for the torts of their agents and employees.
(To be continued)
""In California and Pennsylvania a constitutional provision imposes liability;
in Maryland and perhaps in Pennsylvania legal liability is implied. Cases in 39
L. R. A. 63 et seq.
"Ripley v. Essex 'and Hudson County Free Holders (1878) 40 N. J. L. 45;
Houston v. Police Jury (1848) 3 La. Ann. 566.
'" Cases in 39 L. R. A. 71
